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the European Western experience. Many of the countries that we adopt
from are places in which the United States or other Western countries
had colonies. Our relationship with these countries is a relationship
through which we, as a country, have developed our personality and the
image of ourselves.
The Convention on the Rights of the Child' (CRC) provides a legal
framework that establishes a child's right to be raised in the context of
her family and her culture. We regularly violate this most fundamental
right of children because we fail to come to terms with our imperialist
orientation toward the world. This failure has been caused, in part, by
how we have constructed our way of thinking about intercountry adop-
tion. We now have a conception of ICA that I refer to in this Article as
MonoHumanism.
To many, a focus on the "humanity" of the child may sound univer-
sal, while a focus on cultural or national identity may sound partial.
Similarly, MonoHumanism may at first blush seem inclusive rather than
ethnocentric or myopic. I have chosen this phrase purposefully, though,
due to the strength of the inversion of the ideal of inclusiveness that ac-
companies this language. The phrase MonoHumanism was chosen
because of the juxtaposition of "Mono" with the word "Humanism" to
underscore the ethnocentric and myopic failure to include discourses that
have their origins in the lives, cultures, and vocabulary of historically
oppressed peoples, in an area that is often conceived of as a "win-win"
for all parties involved and as the most humanitarian of endeavors. Even
more fundamentally, the term "Mono" seems to exclude other possibili-
ties and is commonly used that way, for example, with the terms
,'monotheistic" and "monolithic."
On a basic level, MonoHumanism reflects a collective notion identi-
fying "us" as Americans and everyone else as "the other."
MonoHumanism is fundamentally the notion of American culture as a
superior one in comparison with all non-American peoples and cultures.
What MonoHumanism represents, more specifically, is the notion that
the United States has substituted its own view of all non-American peo-
ples or cultures for positive knowledge of them,2 facilitating the creation
of the Western identity of self as the normative center. The narrative of
identity that accompanies MonoHumanism subscribes both universality
and superiority to Western knowledge and discourse, which effectively
results in the exclusion and displacement of the knowledge and dis-
1. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (Dec. 12,1989) [hereinafter CRC].
2. As Edward Said has observed, the dominant group sometimes substitutes its own
view of the other for positive knowledge of it. EDWARD SAID, ORIENTALISM 1-13 (1979)
(hereinafter SAID, ORIENTALISM].
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course of historically oppressed peoples.3 In the context of intercountry
adoption, MonoHumanism means that children are not seen in the con-
text of their family, community, and culture, but instead, narrowly as the
potential children of Western adults. In other words, children are seen
through a narrative of identity in the United States, which I am calling
MonoHumanism, to the exclusion of knowledge and discourse with its
origins in the lives, cultures, and vocabulary of the children themselves.
ICA is most often conceived of as both humanitarian and the only
viable option for children who are adopted. But, while there are plenty of
situations in which there are realistically no other options for adopted
children, and many end up in loving, adoptive homes, that does not tell
the entire story. We now have laws in place to recognize and protect
children who might have the option of being raised by their birth parents
or other caregivers in the context of their culture. And, by acknowledg-
ing the power of discourse, we can begin to dismantle the concept of
MonoHumanism in order to make room for a more nuanced conversation
that reflects the interests of children and the countries from which they
come.
3. See id. at 21-22.
4. I use the terms "discourse" and "discursive formations" interchangeably. These
terms refer to themes that shape our understanding of intercountry adoption (ICA). While
these themes often represent, on a fundamental level, seeing Americans as "us" and seeing
everyone else, including the adopted child, as "other," the themes have more specific manifes-
tations in our discourse about ICA. I am loosely basing my use of the terms "discourse" and
"discursive formations" on Michel Foucault's uses of those terms. See, e.g., MICHEL Fou-
CAULT, THE ARCHEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Tavistock Publ'ns
1972) (1969). One particularly good example of the power of discourse is provided in Fou-
cault's The Order of Things, which he begins by quoting a passage from the Argentine writer,
Jorge Luis Borges:
[A] "certain Chinese encyclopedia" ... divides animals into the following catego-
ries: "(a) belonging to the Emperor, (b) embalmed, (c) tame, (d) sucking pigs, (e)
sirens, (f) fabulous, (g) stray dogs, (h) included in the present classification, (i)
frenzied, (j) innumerable, (k) drawn with a very fine camelhair brush, (1) et cetera,
(m) having just broken the water pitcher, (and] (n) that from a long way off look
like flies."
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES xvi
(Routledge Classics 2002) (1966). Why does this collection of "kinds" of animals seem so
funny? It is because, as Foucault recognizes, it violates our sense of order, a sense that is only
based in an absolute reality to the extent that we have created it ourselves. Id. Similarly, Jean-
Paul Sartre has said that "existence comes before essence," suggesting that rather than the
meaning of things being predetermined, the meaning of things is created by man. Jean-Paul
Sartre, Existentialism Is a Humanism (1946), reprinted in EXISTENTIALISM FROM
DOSTOYEVSKY TO SARTRE 287, 289 (Walter Kaufmann ed., 1966). The work of cognitive
psychologists also supports this notion. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Legal
Canons: An Introduction, in LEGAL CANONS 3, 21 (J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson eds.,
2000) ("Cognitive psychologists from Eleanor Rosch onward have noted that human beings
tend to focus on certain members of categories that they regard as most representative or sali-
ent.").
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I have made a conscious choice to focus on discourse in law review
articles This is in large part because of the power of attorneys in the
United States and the impact that their work can have on the lives of
families. On one level, out of the three branches of government, one, the
judiciary, is almost exclusively made up of attorneys. And, on the other,
it is attorneys who pass laws in the legislative branch, lobby to get these
laws changed, challenge the constitutionality of these laws, and represent
in court families who are subject to these laws. Many international trea-
ties such as the CRC need implementing legislation in order to be
effective, as they are not self-executing. It is also lawyers, of course, who
engage in legal scholarship. Thus, given the influence of lawyers in our
society, I have chosen to focus my efforts on analyzing legal scholarship
on adoption. But, even though I have chosen to focus my efforts on ana-
lyzing law review articles, there is no reason to think that these
narratives do not also exist in the media, in reports of governmental and
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), in other scholarship on adop-
tion, or in any other "non-legal" source. The law review articles written
on ICA, as a matter of course, cite coverage of adoption from all of these
sources, and, thus, base their narratives on these sources.6 It is also true
that law professors often write op-ed columns on adoption that are re-
flective of their scholarly work .
In Part I of this Article, I provide a brief history of ICA. In Part II,
using a post-colonialist theoretical framework, I explore the work of le-
gal scholars from the past twenty years on the subject of ICA.' This
5. My review of legal scholarship includes works by practitioners, law faculty, and
students.
6. See, e.g., Howard E. Bogard, Who Are the Orphans? Defining Orphan Status and
the Need for an International Convention on Intercountry Adoption, 5 EMORY INT'L L. REV.
571 (1991) (citing, inter alia, Time, the Los Angeles Times, USA Today, U.S. congressional
hearing testimony, books, the Chicago Tribune, The Washington Times, and the U.S. Depart-
ment of State); Anthony D'Amato, Cross-Country Adoption: A Call To Action, 73 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1239 (1998) (citing 20/20, The Washington Post, and The New York Times);
Ruth-Arlene W. Howe, Adoption Laws and Practices in 2000: Serving Whose Interests?, 33
FAM. L.Q. 677 (1999) (citing The Seattle Times and the National Council for Adoption).
7. Elizabeth Bartholet, for example, has written articles on international adoption that
have been published in the The Washington Post and in Vogue, among other publications. See,
e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, Slamming the Door on Adoption, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2007, at B7;
Elizabeth Bartholet, Family Matters, VOGUE, Nov. 1993, at 102.
8. This Article analyzes law review articles on the subject of ICA, many of which are
cited here. In all of them, ICA is a main subject of discussion. See, e.g., Jacqueline Bhabha,
Moving Babies: Globalization, Markets and Transnational Adoption, 28 FLETCHER F. WORLD
AFF. 181 (2004); D. Marianne Blair, Safeguarding the Interests of Children in Intercountry
Adoption: Assessing the Gatekeepers, 34 CAP. U. L. REV. 349 (2005); Bogard, supra note 6;
Richard R. Carlson, The Emerging Law of Intercountry Adoptions: An Analysis of the Hague
Conference on Intercountry Adoption, 30 TULSA L.J. 243 (1994); D'Amato, supra note 6; Sara
Dillon, Making Legal Regimes for Intercountry Adoption Reflect Human Rights Principles:
Transforming the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child with the Hague Con-
[Vol. 30:413
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vention on Intercountry Adoption, 21 B.U. INT'L L.J. 179 (2003); Michele Goodwin, The
Free-Market Approach to Adoption: The Value of a Baby, 26 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 61
(2006); Mary Hora, A Standard of Service That All Families Deserve: The Transformation of
Intercountry Adoption Between the United States and the Russian Federation, 40 BRANDEIS
L.J. 1017 (2002); Howe, supra note 6; Kay Johnson, Politics of International and Domestic
Adoption in China, 36 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 379 (2002); Amy Grillo Kales, The Intercountry
Adoption Act of 2000: Are Its Laudable Goals Worth Its Potential Impact on Small Adoption
Agencies, Independent Intercountry Adoptions, and Ethical Independent Adoption Profession-
als?, 36 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 477 (2004); Lisa M. Katz, A Modest Proposal? The
Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 9
EMORY INT'L L. REV. 283 (1995); Margaret Liu, International Adoptions: An Overview, 8
TEMP. INT'L & COMp. L.J. 187, 189-90 (1994); Nili Luo & David M. Smolin, Intercountry
Adoption and China: Emerging Questions and Developing Chinese Perspectives, 35 CUMB. L.
REV. 597 (2005); Jena Martin, The Good, the Bad & the Ugly? A New Way of Looking at the
Intercountry Adoption Debate, 13 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 173 (2007); Trish Maskew,
Child Trafficking and Intercountry Adoption: The Cambodian Experience, 35 CUMB. L. REV.
619 (2005); Sarah Sargent, Suspended Animation: The Implementation of the Hague Conven-
tion on Intercountry Adoption in the United States and Romania, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV.
351 (2004); Barbara Stark, Baby Girls from China in New York: A Thrice-Told Tale, 2003
UTAH L. REV. 1231 (2003) [hereinafter Stark, Baby Girls]; Barbara Stark, Lost Boys and For-
gotten Girls: Intercountry Adoption, Human Rights, and African Children, 22 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 275 (2003) [hereinafter Stark, Lost Boys]; Stacie I. Strong, Children's Rights in
Intercountry Adoption: Towards a New Goal, 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163 (1995); Cynthia Ellen
Szejner, Intercountry Adoptions: Are the Biological Parents' Rights Protected?, 5 WASH. U.
GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 211, 216-17 (2006); Michelle Van Leeuwen, The Politics of Adoptions
Across Borders: Whose Interests Are Served? (A Look at the Emerging Market of Infants from
China), 8 PAC. RIM L. & POL'Y J. 189 (1999); Lynn D. Wardle, Parentlessness: Adoption
Problems, Paradigms, Policies, and Parameters, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 323
(2005); Barbara Yngvesson, Placing the "Gift Child" in Transnational Adoption, 36 LAW &
Soc'Y REv. 227 (2002) [hereinafter Yngvesson, Placing the "Gift Child"]; Dan Berger, Note,
Improving the Safety and Efficiency of Foreign Adoptions: U.S. Domestic Adoption Programs
and Adoption Programs in Other Countries Provide Lessons for INS Reform, 5 CORNELL J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 33 (1995); Alison Fleisher, Note, The Decline of Domestic Adoption: Intercoun-
try Adoption as a Response to Local Adoption Laws and Proposals to Foster Domestic
Adoption, 13 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 171 (2003); Crystal J. Gates, Student Trend
Paper, China's Newly Enacted Intercountry Adoption Law: Friend or Foe?, 7 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 369 (1999); Nicole Bartner Graff, Note, Intercountry Adoption and the Conven-
tion on the Rights of the Child: Can the Free Market in Children Be Controlled?, 27
SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 405 (2000); Bridget M. Hubing, Note, International Child
Adoptions: Who Should Decide What is in the Best Interests of the Family?, 15 NOTRE DAME
J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 655 (2001); Holly C. Kennard, Student Comment, Curtailing the
Sale and Trafficking of Children: A Discussion of the Hague Conference Convention in Re-
spect of Intercountry Adoptions, 14 U. PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 623 (1994); Erika Lynn Kleiman,
Note, Caring for Our Own: Why American Adoption Law and Policy Must Change, 30
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 327 (1997); Molly S. Marx, Comment, Whose Best Interests Does
It Really Serve? A Critical Examination of Romania's Recent Self-Serving International Adop-
tion Policies, 21 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 373 (2007); Mary Ann Candelario McMillan,
Comment, International Adoption: A Step Towards a Uniform Process, 5 PACE INT'L L. REV.
137 (1993); Stephanie Sue Padilla, Note, Adoption of Alien Orphan Children: How United
States Immigration Law Defines Family, 7 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 817 (1993); Veronica S. Root,
Note, Angelina and Madonna: Why All the Fuss? An Exploration of the Rights of the Child
and Intercountry Adoption Within African Nations, 8 CHI. J. INT'L L. 323 (2007): Elisabeth J.
Ryan, Note, For the Best Interests of the Children: Why the Hague Convention on Intercountry
Winter 20091
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analysis exposes the centrality of MonoHumanism to our discourse on
ICA. I find that no one has engaged in a longitudinal analysis of the
Western adoption discourse in legal scholarship, post-colonialist or oth-
erwise, with the goal of better understanding our conception of ICA, and
of how this conception may affect the rights of children to be raised in
the context of their birth families. Furthermore, notwithstanding volumi-
nous legal scholarship on ICA, only a few legal scholars have attempted
to use post-colonialist theory as an analytical tool in this area, either ex-
plicitly or in a way that is conceptually aligned with post-colonialist
theory.9 In Part III, I illustrate how our discourse regarding intercountry
Adoption Needs to Go Farther, as Evidenced by Implementation in Romania and the United
States, 29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 353 (2006).
9. See, e.g., Twila L. Perry, Transracial and International Adoption: Mothers, Hierar-
chy, Race, and Feminist Legal Theory, 10 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 101, 135 (1998) [hereinafter
Perry, Mothers] (using post-colonialist theory to support her argument that developing nations
are often perceived as "subordinate nations" in the context of international adoption, and plac-
ing black women, other women of color, and poor women at the center of her analysis). While
Twila Perry's work reflects the most direct reference to post-colonial theory, other legal schol-
ars have attempted to expose colonial, imperialistic, or neocolonial motivations in the context
of international adoption. For example, Ryiah Lilth sees ICA and mail-order bride buying as
indistinguishable, aside from the fact that ICA is often justified by imperialist and colonialist
discourses of morality articulated by religious and humanitarian organizations. Ryiah Lilth,
Note, Buying a Wife But Saving a Child: A Deconstruction of Popular Rhetoric and Legal
Analysis of Mail-Order Brides and Intercountry Adoptions, 9 BUFF. WOMEN'S L.J. 225, 229,
258-59, 262 (2001). Similarly, while not referencing post-colonial literature, David M.
Smolin describes an othering process in explaining an "adoption myth" prevalent in the inter-
national adoption community, in which virtuous adoptive parents bond with grateful and
loving orphans, which is contrasted with the denigration of biological parents from developing
countries. David M. Smolin, Child Laundering as Exploitation: Applying Anti-Trafficking
Norms to Intercountry Adoption Under the Coming Hague Regime, 32 VT. L. REV. 1, 3, 5-6
(2007) [hereinafter Smolin, Child Exploitation]. Again, reflecting the post-colonialist practice
of placing the subject at the center of the analysis, Smolin tries to reframe the adoption debate
by using narratives from intercountry adoptees, birth parents, adoptive parents, middle agents,
government agents, international agents, and legal scholars to reconstruct the "identity" of
exploited "subjects" from the developing world and thereby expose the "apologists" of ICA.
Id. at 18-45; see also David M. Smolin, Child Laundering: How the Intercountry Adoption
System Legitimizes and Incentivizes the Practice of Buying, Trafficking, Kidnapping and Steal-
ing Children, 52 WAYNE L. REV. 113, 135-60 (2006) [hereinafter Smolin, Child Laundering];
David M. Smolin, The Two Faces of Intercountry Adoption: The Significance of the Indian
Adoption Scandals, 35 SETON HALL L. REV. 403, 451-74 (2005) [hereinafter Smolin, The Two
Faces]. Claudia Fonseca makes a similar use of narratives of the poor in Brazilianfavelas to
empower the would-be subjects of "adoption myths," by describing local community-based
practices of "child circulation and adocao a' brasileira [adoption Brazilian-style]." Claudia
Fonseca, Inequality Near and Far: Adoption as Seen from the Brazilian Favelas, 36 LAW &
Soc'y REv. 397, 404-12 (2002) [hereinafter Fonseca, Inequality]. Fonseca sees the "child-
saving-rhetoric" that is relied on by adoption agencies to position their work as beyond re-
proach, and to suggest that adoptive parents (who are often wealthy, at least by comparison)
are moral, upstanding, and capable, as opposed to birth parents who (often poor) are charac-
terized as irresponsible, uncivilized, sexually unrestrained, and immoral. Id. at 420-22.
Fonseca notes thatfavela mothers are effectively legally disenfranchised so as to be unable to
protect themselves or their children in an inequitable system in which the global South, or
[Vol. 30:413
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adoption contributes to our violating the rights of children (and families)
as they are defined in the CRC. Lastly, in Part IV, I explore how my ar-
gument fits into the current and somewhat polarized debate on ICA and
how the world might look if we were to dismantle and reject the concept
of MonoHumanism. As I discuss in Part IV, a world without MonoHu-
manism might result in reforms that are more responsive to the child's
rights and the rights of families whose economic circumstances seem to
propel adoption. Such reforms could, for example, include requiring in-
dividuals and the United States to contribute to programs designed to
facilitate family preservation and in-country placement of children, legal
reform that makes a child's right to be raised in the context of her fam-
ily-as this right is reflected in the CRC-a precondition to even
considering adoption, and could also include focusing more resources on
the enforcement of laws that protect the right of a child to live in the
context of her family.
I. INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: A BRIEF HISTORY
Most people identify ICA as a post-World War II phenomenon,
which is only partially correct. The movement of children into the colo-
nies through slavery and indenture, ° and the so-called "orphan trains" in
the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, were a precursor
to modem-day ICA."
developing countries, are on one side, and the global North, or Western countries, are on the
other. Id. at 423-27.
10. See, e.g., MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS:
A HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY 2 (1994) (explaining that children who came to America as
slaves or indentured servants "were an important part of the colonies' settlement"); BARBARA
BENNETT WOODHOUSE, HIDDEN IN PLAIN SIGHT: THE TRAGEDY OF CHILDREN'S RIGHTS
FROM BEN FRANKLIN TO LIONEL TATE 63 (2008) ("The United States was settled, in large
part, by working indentured children-many of whom were bound out for long terms of ser-
vice and separated by an ocean from their parents.").
11. In 1853, a minister named Charles Loring Brace took on the task of "saving" thou-
sands of children in New York who were seen on the streets searching for money, food, and
shelter. After deciding that the only way in which to save these children was to send them to
Christian homes in the country, Brace founded the Children's Aid Society in order to arrange
trips, raise money, and obtain the legal permissions needed to relocate these children. More
than 100,000 children were sent, via so-called orphan trains, between 1854 and 1929. While
the "orphan trains" were not "international," they reflected an early example of a large-scale
attempt to "save" children by taking them out of their environments and placing them into new
environments with new families while encouraging a total break with their past. See generally
MARILYN IRVIN HOLT, THE ORPHAN TRAINS: PLACING OUT IN AMERICA (1992); MIRIAM Z.
LANGSAM, CHILDREN WEST: A HISTORY OF THE PLACING-OUT SYSTEM OF THE NEW YORK
CHILDREN'S AID SOCIETY 1853-1890 (1964); I-IV ORPHAN TRAIN HERITAGE Soc'Y OF AM.,
ORPHAN TRAIN RIDERS: THEIR OWN STORIES (Kay B. Hall ed., 1992, 1993); EILEEN SIMP-
SON, ORPHANS: REAL AND IMAGINARY (1987).
Winter 2009]
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Notwithstanding this history, ICA as it is commonly conceived of in
the United States began in earnest after World War H..12 In the aftermath
of a war, intercountry adoption was viewed as a benevolent humanitarian
solution.13 The emergence of this phenomenon opened the door to a
surge of adoptions from Korea after the Korean War in 1954.' 4 Many of
the children adopted from Korea during this time were the children of
U.S. servicemen who had been stationed in Korea.15 Then President of
Korea Syngman Rhee began an intercountry adoption program to deal
with the problem of "orphaned" children, who numbered in the thou-
sands.
6
The media went through a revolution of sorts around the time of the
Korean War,'7 and, thus, "the media's ability to cover the Korean War
and carry the plight of the orphans into the homes and hearts of Middle
America fueled rescue fantasies in a way that was not possible during
World War II.,', 8 In part, because of social upheaval and poverty as a di-
rect consequence of the war,'9 widespread Korean adoption continued
through the 1980s, and, by the mid-1980s, over 6,000 Korean children
had been placed in the United States.20 South Korea was the country
12. Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues,
13 BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151, 159 (2007) [hereinafter Bartholet, Thoughts]. Bartholet
noted,
The numbers and pattern of international adoptions have changed over the years
.... Yet there was virtually no matching of these children with these adults until af-
ter the Second World War. That war left the predictable deaths and devastation, and
made the plight of parentless children in the vanquished countries visible to the
world at a time when adoption was beginning to seem like a more viable option to
childless adults in more privileged countries who were interested in parenting. Thus
began the first wave of international adoptions ....
Id.; see Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, International Asian Adoption: In the Best Interests of the
Child?, 10 TEx. WESLEYAN L. REV. 343, 343 (2004) ("International adoption in the United
States began with the placement of children from Europe following World War II*"); see also
Peter Selman, The Movement of Children for Intercountry Adoption: A Demographic Perspec-
tive (Aug. 18-24, 2001) (poster presentation at the XXtVth International Union for the
Scientific Study in Population (IUSSP) General Population Conference), available at
http://www.iussp.org/Brazil2001/s20/S27 P05_Selman.pdf.
13. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 343.
14. Id.; Bartholet, Thoughts, supra note 12, at 159.
15. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 343; see also Bartholet, Thoughts, supra note 12, at
159 (explaining that "[t]he Korean War led to the opening up of South Korea for adoption in
part because of war-created needs: orphaned and abandoned children, and children fathered by
American soldiers who would face discrimination in Korean society").
16. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 343; see also Bartholet, Thoughts, supra note 12, at
160.
17. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 343.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 344.
20. Id.
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from which the most people in the United States adopted for a number of
years, but it has now been surpassed by China and Guatemala.2 While
there are intercountry adoption programs in many countries around the
world, these countries are not as significant as China and Guatemala in
terms of the number of children placed in the United States. Ethiopia, for
example, has received a surge of recent media attention," due in part to
recent celebrity adoptions from there, but in terms of absolute numbers it
does not place among the top countries from which Americans adopt.23
Adoptions by U.S. families in the aftermath of the Korean War have
been described as "compassionate" 24 and have often been compared to
the adoption of European children following World War 11.25 While these
eras have many parallels, they are also different in significant ways.26 For
one thing, most of the children adopted in the aftermath of World War II
21. U.S. Dep't of State, Table XIII: Significant Source Countries of Immigrant Orphans
(Totals for IR-3 and IR-4 Immigrant Visas Issued to Orphans, Fiscal Years 1998-2007),
http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY07AnnualReportTableXIII.pdf (last visited Jan. 26, 2009)
[hereinafter U.S. Dep't of State, Table XIII]. According to U.S. Department of State official
statistics, in 2007, there were 939 U.S. adoptions from South Korea, as compared to 5,453
from China, 2,310 from Russia, and 4,728 from Guatemala. See id.; see also Bartholet,
Thoughts, supra note 12, at 160. Bartholet stated,
For years Korea was the source of most of the children coming into the [United
States] for adoption, largely because it was one of relatively few countries that de-
signed its international adoption system to facilitate placement of children in need
of homes with adults abroad who would provide them. But then South Korea began
to limit the number of children released for adoption abroad. Political forces op-
posed to international adoption criticized the government for "selling" its children
to foreigners, and shamed it in the press during the 1988 Seoul Olympics, changing
the overall political dynamic surrounding international adoption. By 2006 Korea
was only the fourth largest sending country to the [United States].
Id. (citations omitted).
22. Jane Gross & Will Connors, Surge in Adoptions Raises Concerns in Ethiopia,
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2007, at Al [hereinafter Gross & Connors, Surge in Adoptions];
Contactmusic.com, Angelina Jolie-Jolie's Latest Adoption Increases Ethiopia Interest,
http://www.contactmusic.com/new/xmlfeed.nsf/mndwebpages/jolies%20latest%20adopti
on%20increases%20ethiopia%20interest (last visited Jan. 26, 2009). International inter-
est in adopting from Ethiopia cannot solely be attributed to the fact that stars, such as
Angelina Jolie, brought attention to adopting children from Ethiopia. The increase in adop-
tions from Ethiopia is occurring at a time when Ethiopia's process for adopting internationally
has been described as considerably more efficient than the process of some other countries,
and at a time when it is more difficult to adopt from countries from which American families
have historically adopted. See, e.g., Jane Gross & Will Connors, Efficient Adoptions Attract
U.S. Couples to Ethiopia, INT'L HERALD TRIB., June 4, 2007, at 2, available at http://
www.iht.com/articles/2007/06/04/europe/adopt.php (last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
23. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of State, Table XIII, supra note 21. For example, compared to
5,453 adoptions from China in 2007, there were only 1,255 children adopted from Ethiopia in
the same year.
24. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 344.
25. Id.
26. Id.
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were adopted from countries that the United States viewed as "equal,"
but for the fact that these countries had just gone through a war that had
left them in an economically, socially, and politically precarious position
vis-h-vis the United States. 7 These countries were of the "First World"
and were made up of white Europeans who were ethnically different, but
not so different that it would be difficult to assimilate them into U.S. so-
ciety.& Furthermore, the children who were adopted in the aftermath of
World War II were often adopted by families who shared the same ethnic
heritage as these children.29
Korea, on the other hand, was considered a "third-world 30 country
"with a long history of occupation and colonization by the United States,
China and Japan."3' The relationship between the United States and Ko-
rea was defined by the geopolitical interests of the United States.32 The
United States had a military presence in Korea to protect its strategic
interests, and the people of Korea had little economic, political, or mili-
tary power compared to the United States.33 The nature of the
relationship between the two countries was part of the backdrop against
which intercountry adoption from Korea took place during this time.
Consequently, intercountry adoption from Korea was seen as particularly
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. The term "Third World" originated during the Cold War in order to refer to nations
not aligned with either the communist or non-communist blocs, and this term is often used to
describe underdeveloped nations, particularly those in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.
Throughout this Article, sending countries are sometimes described as "Third World" coun-
tries or developing countries, and receiving countries are described as developed countries,
Western nations, or "First World" countries. These expressions mimic the language used in the
reviewed articles. However, these expressions are also problematic due to the othering process
involved. These expressions promote sending countries or poor countries as less evolved or
developmentally incomplete and in need of guidance by those who are developed or hierarchi-
cally superior. The objective of this Article is not, however, to debate this othering process in
referencing non-dominant countries. In any case, I may use the expression "Third World"
country from time to time in an attempt to reappropriate the phrase to signify an alternative, a
third way, or another point of view. In this Article, I also use the terms "sending" and "receiv-
ing" countries. This use echoes the language used in many law review articles. These
expressions are themselves problematic, however, due to the fact that they imply equity be-
tween the countries involved and mask the power differential between them.
31. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 344.
32. Id. During the Cold War, the United States had various strategic alliances with
Western Europe and with various Asian countries, including South Korea. During this time,
South Korea was "part of a governmentalized realm of a hegemonic U.S. State and, as a con-
sequence, enjoyed geopolitical proximity to the United States. The United States was
responsible for and had a primordial obligation to the governments of these [Sltates."
GEAR6ID 6. TUATHAIL, Between a Holocaust and a Quagmire: "Bosnia" in the U.S. Geo-
Political Imagination, 1991-1994, in CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS 148, 149 (1997).
33. See, e.g., MARK BORTHWICK, PACIFIC CENTURY: THE EMERGENCE OF MODERN
PACIFIC ASIA (2007); TrATHAIL, supra note 32.
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benevolent; many U.S. parents' decisions to adopt were apparently moti-
vated by a religious or moral desire to "save" orphans from an
impoverished third-world country.34
In addition to the geopolitical interests of the United States, the U.S.
civil rights and women's movements also formed part of the backdrop to
intercountry adoption in the United States.35 These movements "brought
about a new consciousness of brother/sisterhood, global citizenship, and
social responsibility."" The idealism and activist sentiments of the time
resulted in demands that the United States atone for its history of racial
and gender subordination.3 ' The desire to "save" children from third-
world countries and a sentiment of social responsibility are evident in the
motivations of some parents who decided to adopt internationally during
the 1960s and 1970s.3" Joe Kroll, the executive director of the North
American Counsel of Adoptable Children and parent of a Korean
adoptee, reflected this sentiment in his testimony before a congressional
subcommittee:
As transracial adopters in the seventies, my wife and I (and
many others) went blissfully into the process thinking we would
save children and integrate society by integrating our family. No
one asked our infant daughter what she thought. As white adults
we had certain privileges that allowed us to pick and choose
from where our children would come.3 9
Whereas during World War 11 the motivation to adopt children inter-
nationally appeared to revolve around an altruistic core, the societal
concept of adoption became a slightly more complex phenomenon
during the 1960s and 1970s, when the needs of parents took a more
prominent place in the collective psyche and adoption became a way to
meet parental needs for children. On the coattails of the women's rights
34. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 344.
35. Id. at 345.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. The child welfare system in the United States also has its foundations in this con-
cept of "child saving:' or "the idea that children should be rescued from the ills of poverty by
taking them away from their parents." Susan L. Brooks & Dorothy E. Roberts, Social Justice
and Family Court Reform, 40 FAM. CT. REv. 453, 453 (2002); see also LINDA GORDON, THE
GREAT ARIZONA ORPHAN ABDUCTION (1999) (telling the story of an "orphan train" in which
forty children were removed from urban, poor neighborhoods by New York nuns and sent to
farming communities, based on the prevalent child-welfare principle at the time that children
should be saved from the ills of poverty and relocated to "proper" environments in which they
could thrive).
39. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 345 (quoting Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 104th Cong. (1998) (statement of Joe Kroll,
Executive Director, North American Counsel on Adoptable Children).
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movement, couples were having children later (as women increasingly
aspired to careers),4° which was accompanied by a rise in infertility.4'
Birth control 42 abortion,43 and the societal acceptance of single-parent
households meant that there were fewer white infants available for adop-
tion.44 Soon, more families were in "need" of children than before. As
one scholar put it, "[i]ntemational adoption became a matter of finding
children for childless couples. Motivation for adoption ha[d] shifted
from the altruistic, finding a home for a parentless child, to the supply
and demand economics of finding children for childless couples.4 5
But it was not only the tangible need for a child that was met here;
adopting children of different nationalities, ethnicities, and races also
was one way in which individuals could meet (what appeared to be) a
widespread need to make a statement about social responsibility and the
ability to participate in crossing racial and ethnic boundaries in a society
that was trying to atone for its racial past.46 An additional element of the
motivation to adopt internationally may also have been an element of
asserting oneness with all peoples, as many in the post-World War II
generation were reacting against the inhumanity of racist and divisive
ideology.
47
40. See id. at 345; see, e.g., MARY BETH NORTON, A PEOPLE AND A NATION: A His-
TORY OF THE UNITED STATES, BRIEF EDITION, VOLUME B: SINCE 1865, at 403 (2d ed. 1982).
41. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 346.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Bartholet explained, "In the [United States] and elsewhere, prospective parents ...
found fewer infants available domestically to adopt because of an increase in the use of birth
control and abortion, and a decrease in the stigma against single birth mothers keeping their
babies to raise themselves." Bartholet, Thoughts, supra note 12, at 164; see also Martha Garri-
son, Why Terminate Parental Rights?, 35 STAN. L. REV. 423, 443 (1983) ("The greater
availability of abortion and contraception, as well as a new willingness of unwed mothers to
keep their babies, all but dried up the supply of traditionally adoptable children.").
45. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 346.
46. Id. at 345-46. Potential adoptive parents turned to international adoption, as op-
posed to adopting African-American children, because of opposition to interracial adoption in
the United States, perceptions of administrative ease, and the belief that adopting internation-
ally was less likely to fall through and was more "humanitarian." See, e.g., id. at 345-46
(discussing the opposition of the National Association of Black Social Workers to interracial
adoption); see also Kathleen Ja Sook Bergquist, Mary E. Campbell & Yvonne A. Unrau, Cau-
casian Parents and Korean Adoptees: A Survey of Parents Perceptions, 6 ADOPTION Q. 41
(2003) (exploring the motivation of adoptive parents to adopt internationally instead of domes-
tically); Solangel Maldonado, Discouraging Racial Preferences in Adoptions, 39 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1415 (2006) (attempting to debunk the myths about domestic and international adop-
tions and to show that racial preferences, even if unconscious, play a role in many Americans'
decisions to adopt internationally).
47. Franklin & Eleanor Roosevelt Inst., Introduction to Human Rights, http://www.udhr.org/
Introduction/ (last visited Jan. 8, 2009) (discussing the context in which the U.N. Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights was created, including a discussion of the consciousness created as a result
of Nazi tyranny during World War II). This generation-the "baby boomers"-grew up in a
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Intercountry adoption typically involves an exchange between a de-
veloping country and an industrialized country. Whether the exchange
is viewed as one between birth parents with very few resources, and
families with resources, or as one between a country with an extensive
(admittedly imperfect) social service infrastructure and a country with
no social service infrastructure, the exchange bears a neo-colonialist
hue.49 For the purposes of this Article, however, what is important is the
picture of the "international child" accepted by Western society. It is the
picture that we have painted to suit our own needs, a picture that does
not always reflect the true needs of the sending countries or uncover the
children who are truly most in need of parents. With respect to those
children,
[i]nternational adoption isn't the answer to improving the overall
plight of children in developing countries. Even the strongest
supporters admit the movement of adoptees across international
borders represents only a tiny fraction of the neglected, abused
and abandoned children in these countries. And supporters of in-
ternational adoption are quiet about the children who are left
behind.0
It is because of the children who are left behind that our collective
recognition of the existence of MonoHumanism is so important. One
way to get there is through the lens of post-colonialism. It is to this that I
turn next.
time in which the United Nations was honored and looked to with hope for lasting peace, and
in which organizations such as the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) and Save the Children
encouraged Americans to see all children everywhere as "our" children-to feel responsibility
for them. It was, in part, Nazi tyranny that had resulted in the creation of a consciousness that
reflects the notion that we are all entitled to basic fundamental human rights and that we all
carry a responsibility to protect those rights. See generally Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec.
12, 1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
48. See Bergquist, supra note 12, at 349.
49. Id. Bergquist noted,
Adoption usually involves an exchange between a resource rich and resource lim-
ited community or country. Economic necessity is one of the dominant factors in
relinquishment, whether it be by a birth parent or a country whose social services
infrastructure cannot support the number of children in care, at least initially. The
neocolonialism inherent in that exchange is striking. The acquiring of a country's or
people's resources as a necessary function of colonialism is arguably the case in in-
ternational adoption, with children being a national resource.
Id.
50. Bergquist, supra note 12, at 349 (internal citation omitted).
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II. INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP AND
THE EMERGENCE OF MoNOHUMANISM
A. Post-Colonialism and Intercountry Adoption
Post-colonialism is a set of theories that critique analytical struc-
tures-such as literature, film, law, and political science-that identify
previously colonized peoples through binary opposition structures that
reflect a hierarchical inferiority of the previously colonized popula-
tions."1 Post-colonialist theory originated as a critique of structures that
identified previously colonized people in opposition to what was defined
as a "superior" occidental identity. According to these analytical struc-
tures, the post-colonial is an antipodal and lesser "other," essential for
creating the Western identity of "self' as the normative center." This nar-
rative of identity allows the West to subscribe both universality and
superiority to its body of knowledge and discourse, including its "sup-
51. The foundational post-colonial texts include those of Frantz Fanon, Ngugi wa
Thiong'o, Chinua Achebe, Haunani-Kay Trask, Trinh Minh-Ha, and Albert Memmi. Edward
Said's book, Orientalism, is generally accepted as the founding work of post-colonial studies.
See SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 2. In Orientalism, Said criticized a tradition of views of
the West based on an era of European imperialism in previous centuries in which Europe
dominated the Middle and Near East, and he argued that, from its position of imperialistic
dominance, the United States had defined the "Orient" in a bare binary way as "the other" in
order to solidify itself as perennially superior. See id. at 1-28. According to Said, an accep-
tance of the self-referential framework of the West-a view that is entrenched and continues to
dominate Western views of the East (and other countries in the developing world)-keeps the
post-colonial "other" in a subordinate position in Western paradigms. See id. at 201-328. A
consequence of this, and of particular relevance to this Article, is that the West then feels mor-
ally validated--or even obligated-to exercise a paternalistic and dominant role in "guiding"
the lesser other. See generally id. An illustration of this paradigm is the so-called "white man's
burden," which is a misuse of Rudyard Kipling's title for a poem published in 1899. Rudyard
Kipling, The White Man's Burden, MCCLURE'S MAG., Feb. 1899, at 290; see also EDWARD W.
SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1993). See generally CHINUA ACHEBE, ANTHILLS OF THE
SAVANNAH (1987); CHINUA ACHEBE, THINGS FALL APART (1959); FRANTZ FANON, BLACK
SKIN, WHITE MASKS (Charles Lam Markmann trans., Grove Press 1967) (1952); FRANTZ
FANON, A DYING COLONIALISM (Haakon Chevalier trans., Grove Press 1965) (1959); FRANTZ
FANON, TOWARD THE AFRICAN REVOLUTION (Haakon Chevalier trans., Grove Press 1967)
(1964); FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH (Constance Farrington trans., Grove
Press 1963) (1961); ALBERT MEMMI, THE COLONIZER AND THE COLONIZED (Howard
Greenfeld trans., 1965) (1957); TRINH MINH-HA, WOMAN, NATIVE, OTHER 47-76 (1989);
NG6GT WA THIONG'o, DECOLONIZING THE MIND: THE POLITICS OF LANGUAGE IN AFRICAN
LITERATURE 4 (1986); HAUNANI-KAY TRASK, FROM A NATIVE DAUGHTER: COLONIALISM AND
SOVEREIGNTY IN HAWAI'I 3, 21 (1993); Ngfigi wa Thiong'o, Moving the Center: An Interview
with Charles Cantalupo, in THE WORLD OF NGUGI WA THIONG'o 207, 219-20 (Charles Can-
talupo ed., Afr. World Press, Inc. 1995) (1993).
52. Kenneth Nunn, defining "otherness," stated, "(1) the other is a means of defining
the self; (2) the other is an abstraction; (3) the other cannot define itself; and (4) the other is to
be feared and controlled." Kenneth B. Nunn, The Child as Other: Race and Differential
Treatment in the Juvenile Justice System, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 679, 698 (2002).
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porting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, [and] doctrines. 3
The aim of post-colonial theory is to expose provincialism in Western
theory and politics, in favor of heterogeneous discourses, particularly
discourses that have their origins in the lives, cultures, and vocabulary of
historically oppressed people.54
Post-colonialism has been an analytical tool used by both critical
race scholars and feminist legal scholars to expose "othering processes"
in structural and linguistic aspects of legal scholarship, in legal practice,
and in jurisprudence.55 International law, and specifically international
human rights law, has also been analyzed, and scrutinized, through a
post-colonialist lens 6
53. SAID, ORIENTALISM, supra note 2, at 2.
54. As a general matter, post-colonial theorists are interested in discourse of resistance
from so-called "subalterns." This term, "subaltern," is used by post-colonial theorists to de-
scribe people or groups of people considered of inferior rank. See generally MAPPING
SUBALTERN STUDIES AND THE POSTCOLONIAL (Vinayak Chaturvedi ed., 2000); READING
SUBALTERN STUDIES: CRITICAL HISTORY, CONTESTED MEANING AND THE GLOBALIZATION
OF SOUTH ASIA (David Ludden ed., 2001); ROBERT YOUNG, WHITE MYTHOLOGIES: WRITING
HISTORY AND THE WEST (1990).
55. See generally Richard Delgado, Rodrigo 's Corrido: Race, Postcolonial Theory, and
U.S. Civil Rights, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1691 (2007) (using narratives to discuss post-colonial
theory and its insights into LatCrit and civil rights movements); Richard Schur, The Dialogic
Criticism of Richard Delgado: Chicano/a Literature, Equality, and the Rhetoric of Form, 19
LAW & INEQ. 129 (2001) (analyzing Richard Delgado's work, also through the use of narra-
tives, to expose and deconstruct "otherness" in legal scholarship and in reference to critical
race legal theory (CRT)). See also Stephen M. Feldman, The Politics of Postmodern Jurispru-
dence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 166, 190 (1996); Reginald Leamon Robinson, Human Agency,
Negated Subjectivity, and White Structural Oppression: An Analysis of Critical Race Prac-
tice/Praxis, 53 AM. U. L. REV. 1361 (2004) (critiquing CRT praxis and its failure to avoid
structural determinism in its own arguments).
56. See generally Padideh Ala'i, A Human Rights Critique of the WTO: Some Prelimi-
nary Observations, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 537 (2001) (discussing a U.N. report that
suggests that colonialism principles exist in the current international financial order); Antony
Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century Interna-
tional Law, 40 HARV. INT'L L.J. 1 (1999) (exposing racism and colonialism in the foundations
of international law); Tayyab Mahmud, Geography and International Law: Towards a Post-
colonial Mapping, 5 SANTA CLARA J. INT'L L. 525 (2007) (linking the drawing of nation-state
boundaries to the rise of international law and the entrenchment of "otherness" in the concep-
tualization of the Third World); Karin Mickelson, Rhetoric and Rage: Third World Voices in
International Legal Discourse, 16 Wis. INT'L L.J. 353 (1998) (presenting third-world dis-
courses about international law); Makau Wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J.
INT'L L. 589, 597, 617 (1996); Sundhya Pahuja, The Postcoloniality of International Law, 46
HARv. INT'L L.J. 459 (2005); Chantal Thomas, Causes of Inequality in the International Eco-
nomic Order. Critical Race Theory and Postcolonial Development, 9 TRANSNAT'L L. &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (1999) (invoking CRT methodology and post-colonialism for analyzing
the international economic legal order); Deborah M. Weissman, The Human Rights Dilemma:
Rethinking the Humanitarian Project, 35 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 259 (2004) (suggesting
that, as part of the human rights project, advocates need to address the reality that human
rights narratives and discourses are often used to advance agendas of domination, particularly
by developed nations). See also Beth Lyon, Discourse in Development: A Post-Colonial
"Agenda" for the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 10
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Even though it may seem obvious that post-colonial theory is rele-
vant to intercountry adoption, it has not been widely used as an
analytical tool in this area. 7 The relative lack of post-colonial analysis in
intercountry adoption discourse is a testament to the strength of the
dominant narratives that I discuss in this Article. With few exceptions,
the legal scholars who write in this area may discuss "colonialism," "im-
perialism," or "exploitation" fleetingly in describing debates about ICA,
but the vast bulk of the work of these scholars is essentially "apolitical."
As Twila Perry suggests,
Most law review articles on the subject of international adoption
are essentially apolitical. Often the focus, of concern is the plight
of white Americans seeking to negotiate the adoption of a child
from a third world country, and the goal of the article is usually
to find a way to facilitate the process ....
The emphasis on the need of individual children for adoptive
homes in which they will be nurtured on a one-on-one basis
comes at the expense of thinking harder about the political and
economic circumstances that shape the lives of so many more
children in this society and in the world. The pattern of the trans-
fer of children from poor women to women who are
economically better off or from women who suffer racial subor-
dination to women who possess racial privilege raises questions
that must go beyond the need for nurturing in individual rela-
tionships. For feminists, adoption, like marriage, must be
analyzed as a political institution in which issues of rights, ine-
quality and the potential for exploitation must be central."8
It is this "apolitical" approach in legal scholarship that reflects
MonoHumanism.
B. Through the Post-Colonial Lens: Myths and Othering Processes in
Law Review Articles on the Subject of Intercountry Adoption
As a general matter, legal scholars are inclined to propose reforms to
domestic or international laws, treaties, or conventions in order to
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'v & L. 535 (2002) (showing compatibility with post-colonialism
in the development of the Committee on Economic, Cultural, and Social Rights and observing
challenges in sustaining its work vis-A-vis dominant international financial order); Teemu
Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002) (arguing that Chinese law is inap-
propriately defined by comparison and opposition to Western legal concepts).
57. For the few examples of legal scholars who have used post-colonial theory in this
area, see supra note 9.
58. See Perry, Mothers, supra note 9, at 163-64.
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streamline ICA.59 A dominant theme that runs throughout the narratives
is that children up for adoption are abandoned, at risk of imminent harm,
or, more fundamentally, that intercountry adoption is always the best
solution for these children. 6° In contrast, there are very few articles that
question the wisdom of ICA or discuss the lack of consideration of trans-
racial and transcultural issues in child placement, or the lack of
regulation criminalizing child trafficking or the coercion of birth parents
for the purposes of ICA. The dominant narratives often conceptualize
intercountry adoption solely as the rescue of an "orphan.,,6' These narra-
tives also reflect a narrow conception of children outside of the context
of their family, community, and culture and through a narrow prism as
the potential child of Western adults. These narratives reflect MonoHu-
manism.
There are five dominant narratives in the legal scholarship that I have
defined as follows: (1) the Humanitarian History Narrative; (2) the Res-
cue Narrative; (3) the Improved Life Chances Narrative; (4) the Invisible
Birth Parents Narrative; and (5) the Natural "Market" for Intercountry
Adoption Narrative.
1. Narrative One: The Humanitarian History Narrative
Legal scholars often tell an almost identical "history" regarding the
beginnings of ICA, in which ICA starts as a humanitarian effort to res-
cue orphaned or abandoned children in the aftermath of World War II,
followed by the end of the Korean War and of the Vietnam War.62 These
59. See infra note 112.
60. See infra note 112.
61. See infra note 112.
62. See Lisa Hillis, Intercountry Adoption Under the Hague Convention: Still an At-
tractive Option for Homosexuals Seeking to Adopt?, 6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 237, 239
(1998); Howe, supra note 6, at 682; Kales, supra note 8, at 479 (suggesting that, in the after-
math of World War II and the Korean and the Vietnam wars, the plight of abandoned and
orphaned children was brought to the world); Katz, supra note 8, at 285-86; Caeli E. Kimball,
Barriers to the Successful Implementation of the Hague Convention on Protection of Children
and Co-Operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 33 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 561,
561 (2005); Van Leeuwen, supra note 8, at 191; Liu, supra note 8, at 191-92; Szejner, supra
note 8, at 211; Wardle, supra note 8, at 337-38; Jennifer Banks, Note, The U.S. Market for
Guatemalan Children: Suggestions for Slowing the Rapid Growth of Illegal Practices Plagu-
ing International Child Adoptions, 28 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 31, 33-36 (2004);
Berger, supra note 8, at 42-43; Catherine M. Bitzan, Note, Our Most Precious Resource: How
South Korea Is Poised to Change the Landscape of International Adoption, 17 MINN. J. INT'L
L. 121, 124-25 (2008); Lindsay K. Carlberg, Note, The Agreement Between the United States
and Vietnam Regarding Cooperation on the Adoption of Children: A More Effective and Effi-
cient Solution to the Implementation of the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption or
Just Another Road to Nowhere Paved with Good Intentions?, 17 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REv.
119, 125, 144 (2007); Fleisher, supra note 8. at 176; Brandi R. Foster, Note, Evolution of the
"Traditional Family": A Comparative Analysis of United States' and United Kingdom's Do-
mestic and International Adoption Law, 14 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 315, 319-20 (2003);
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three post-war periods are usually described simply and unequivocally as
humanitarian actions involving adults from the United States and other
Western nations reaching out to children from the developing world who
were in need of parents.
Counternarratives:
An Alternative or More Nuanced "History" of Intercountry Adoption
The recounting of ICA through its humanitarian beginnings is an in-
complete history. World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War
were U.S-supported wars, which, in part, created the conditions that left
children orphaned or abandoned and their countries in disarray.63 An al-
ternative explanation is that Americans resorted to ICA, not solely for
humanitarian reasons, but also to atone for U.S. involvement in the wars
and destruction of the native countries of these children. This counter-
narrative is supported by the fact that ICA often started as military
initiatives that had the purpose of extracting children from their immedi-
Kleiman, supra note 8, at 333; Kate O'Keeffe, Note, The Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000:
The United States' Ratification of the Hague Convention on the Protection of Children, and Its
Meager Effect on International Adoption, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1611, 1615-16 (2007);
Gates, supra note 8, at 370-71; Graff, supra note 8, at 405; Hubing, supra note 8, at 661-62;
Marx, supra note 8, at 375; McMillan, supra note 8, at 137; Linda J. Olsen, Comment, Live or
Let Die: Could Intercountry Adoption Make the Difference?, 22 PENN. ST. INT'L L. REv. 483,
497-99 (2004); Padilla, supra note 8, at 823-24; Ryan, supra note 8, at 362; Sara R. Wallace,
Note, International Adoption: The Most Logical Solution to the Disparity Between the Num-
bers of Orphaned and Abandoned Children in Some Countries and Families and Individuals
Wishing to Adopt in Others?, 20 ARIz. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 689, 692-93 (2003); Stephanie
Zeppa, Note, "Let Me In, Immigration Man ": An Overview of Intercountry Adoption and the
Role of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 22 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 161, 164-
65 (1998).
63. Gates, supra note 8, at 370-72 (noting that, in the aftermath of World War II, inter-
national adoption from many developing countries increased, due to a breakdown in extended
family networks that had served as caregiving networks for foreign children); Padilla, supra
note 8, at 824 ("The next wave of children came from war-torn Vietnam, but this time in the
midst of controversy. Critics alleged that many of the children were not orphaned, but merely
temporarily separated from their parents. Still, between 1963 and 1976, 3267 Vietnamese
children were adopted by [U.S.] parents.").
64. Kleiman, supra note 8, at 332-33. Erika Lynn Kleiman stated,
The reasons for the popularity of international adoption have changed over time.
There was no widespread awareness of the possibility of international adoption un-
til after the Korean War. At that time, in response to American involvement in
Southeast Asia and as an attempt to atone for American destruction of the children's
native countries, Americans began to bring orphaned Asian children to the United
States as a philanthropic gesture.
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ate conditions, rather than the purpose of attempting to find their birth
parents or initiating other placement efforts within the child's country.65
The Humanitarian History Narrative also suggests that, after the Ko-
rean War, war-orphans were universally and unequivocally rejected by
Koreans due to established Confucian beliefs in strict family lineage.
66
However, a counternarrative that helps to provide a more nuanced and
accurate picture indicates that sometimes Koreans opposed ICA due to
the belief that adoption would strip children of their lineage and heri-
tage.67 These counternarratives allow for a more nuanced history of ICA
than one that is simply a humanitarian effort to rescue orphaned and
abandoned children. A more nuanced history might require us to poten-
tially face some difficult questions, for example, regarding whether all
"war-orphans" are truly orphaned or abandoned.
65. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 62, at 33-36 (finding that "Congress enacted the Dis-
placed Persons Act (DPA) in 1948 ... to assuage a temporary refugee crisis rather than
establish a permanent regulatory structure"); O'Keeffe, supra note 62, at 1616-17 (stating
that, in response to public concern after hearing stories from returning military personnel after
World War II, the U.S. Congress enacted the DPA, which allowed entry of orphaned adoptees
outside of country visa quotas and that in 1975, the U.S. military organized "Operation Baby-
lift" to carry out 70,000 Vietnamese orphans, 2,000 of which were sent to the United States, of
which 655 were adopted in 1975 alone); Olsen, supra note 62, at 497 (noting that U.S. legisla-
tive initiatives around ICA after World War II were spearheaded by military personnel).
66. See, e.g., Liu, supra note 8, at 188. Margaret Liu stated that
[t]he Korean War ripped apart a nation and left thousands of children homeless.
Abandoned and institutionalized, these children were unable to find homes in their
native land. Children remained unwanted as the Confucian emphasis on continuing
the family through an unbroken blood line discouraged Korean parents to adopt and
raise children unrelated to them.
Id.; see also Hubing, supra note 8, at 661-62 ("Despite the drastic increase in adoptions in the
United States after World War II, international adoptions did not receive widespread attention
until after the Korean War .... [A] large number of the children were fathered by U.S. sol-
diers and became outcasts of Korean society").
67. See, e.g., Kimball, supra note 62, at 579-80. Caeli E. Kimball noted,
In Asian regions, particularly Korea, bloodlines are extremely important because
they establish one's character. Despite this pride, Korea has a reputation for being a
major baby exporter, sending thousands of its children to be adopted overseas. Part
of Korean opposition to sending Korean children overseas to be adopted by non-
Korean families is the belief that adoption will strip the child of his or her lineage
and heritage, on which Korean culture prides itself. Culturally, Koreans see adop-
tion as "disgraceful [and] shameful." Korea's reputation as a baby exporter has
fueled the societal belief that adoption disgraces the country.
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2. Narrative Two: The Rescue Narrative
The second dominant narrative is the "rescue" narrative, in which
children are conceptualized as children in dire need of being rescued
from their immediate circumstances.
Today, placement of children from war or disaster zones for the pur-
pose of ICA is governed by international treaties on refugees.68 ICA of
refugee children is a placement option of last resort given that war and
other disasters compromise the tracing of a child's origin and make the
determination of orphanage difficult.69 Consequently, ICA narratives
have moved away from "war-orphan" narratives to alternative explana-
tions of why children need to be saved from developing countries. In
contemporary ICA narratives, developing countries suffer conditions that
are insurmountable in the short term, such as economic collapse, politi-
cal instability, civil wars, disaster, disease, overpopulation, and
widespread poverty.70 Children from these countries are said to live in
68. Carlson, supra note 8, at 249 n.20, 261 n.66 (stating that, although refugee children
may still be adopted, ICA is considered the last resort under applicable U.N. refugee conven-
tions and that, given the difficulty in determining a child's status as a refugee, refugee children
were not included in the scope of the Hague Convention); see also Martin, supra note 8, at
183. As a general matter, refugees are people who have been forced to leave their country
based on a well-founded fear of persecution. See, e.g., Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees art. 1, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137. Sometimes, internally dis-
placed children will ask to become refugees in another country. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc.
Council [ECOSOC], Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General, Mr Francis M.
Deng, Submitted Pursuant to Commission Resolution 1997/39. Addendum: Guiding Principles
on Internal Displacement, Principle 15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2 (Feb. 11, 1998)
("Internally displaced persons have ... the right to seek asylum in another country."); Wendy
Perlmutter, An Application of Refugee Law to Child Soldiers, 6 GEO. PUB. POL'Y REv. 137,
137 (2001) ("Approximately 20 million children are members of refugee and internally dis-
placed populations. Many of these children seek refugee status with family members .....
69. Carlson, supra note 8, at 249 n.20.
70. See, e.g., Hillis, supra note 62, at 239 (describing sending countries as "less-
developed nations where factors including the stigma of illegitimacy, the minimal use of con-
traceptives, government instability, war, and poverty contribute to the population of homeless
children"); Banks, supra note 62, at 38 (arguing that in sending countries, such as Guatemala,
"perpetual poverty, political strife and overpopulation create an excess of orphans"); Fleisher,
supra note 8, at 176 (finding that war, poverty, and social upheaval are factors in sending
countries allowing ICA). Liu noted that
[mlillions of children in this world are left without families, homes, and care every
year. The problem is not isolated to any specific country, but exists primarily in
countries where wars or natural disasters leave impoverished families and outcast
mothers no other choice but to relinquish their children out of need or shame.
Id. at 187; see also Strong, supra note 8, at 170 (finding that "a number of lesser developed
countries have an excess of orphans, due to the stigma of illegitimacy, absence of contracep-
tion and abortion services, and governmental instability"); Wardle, supra note 8, at 330-31
(finding that sending countries are war-torn and poor); Ryan, supra note 8, at 356-57 (finding
that sending countries are "marred by political strife, war, and often devastating levels of pov-
erty"); Wallace, supra note 62, at 694 (stating that war, poverty, economic downturn, and
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terrible circumstances and to be at severe risk of high developmental or
physical damage.7' These narratives generate a sense of urgency to ex-
tract children from their home countries before they grow older and
become ruined psychologically or physically by their environments.
The most common narratives directly attribute surging numbers in
orphaned or abandoned children to the incompetence of the governments
of developing countries. Law review articles on ICA consistently repeat
two stories of public policy initiatives-Nicolae Ceau escu's policy of
five children per household and prohibition on contraception in
overpopulation characterize sending countries); Kelly M. Wittner, Comment, Curbing Child-
Trafficking in Intercountry Adoptions: Will International Treaties and Adoption Moratoriums
Accomplish the Job in Cambodia?, 12 PAC. RIM L. & POE'Y J. 595, 598, 618 (2003) (arguing
that sending countries are "war-tom, poverty-stricken countries ... [in which] civil uprisings
and severe poverty produce large numbers of orphaned children").
71. Bogard, supra note 6, at 571-72 (describing the deplorable conditions of Romanian
orphanages in which children spend "aimless hours" in dirt yards or live in dormitories that
"reek[] of sewage and mold" (citation omitted)); Van Leeuwen, supra note 8, at 195, 199 (re-
ferring to reports revealing "ghastly conditions in the state-run orphanages," in which Chinese
baby girls were starving to death and also suffering psychological damage); Berger, supra
note 8, at 37-38, 40 (establishing a direct equivalency between war refugees and poor children
by stating that "[l]ike the refugee programs, ICAs offer hope to children who have little oppor-
tunity to improve their situation, or to escape possibly life-threatening conditions"); Bitzan,
supra note 62, at 141-42 (acknowledging the existence of institutional and foster care for
Korean children, but still positing that either can cause developmental damage to children and
that ICA is a better placement option); Gates, supra note 8, at 375 (stating that "ear and upper
respiratory infections, sores, scabies. ... low birth weight, small stature,. ... developmental
delays," and gastrointestinal parasites are "common conditions of children from Third World
countries"); see also Katherine Sohr, Difficulties Implementing the Hague Convention on the
Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption: A Criticism of
the Proposed Ortega's Law and an Advocacy for Moderate Adoption Reform in Guatemala,
18 PACE INT'L L. REV. 559, 563-64 (2006) ("Unfortunately, as children get older, their
chances for adoption decrease and their potential for developmental delays and emotional
difficulties increases." (citation omitted)); Donovan M. Steltzner, Intercountry Adoption: To-
ward a Regime that Recognizes the "Best Interests" of Adoptive Parents, 35 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 113, 128-29 (2003). Steltzner stated,
Institutional life in an orphanage can be extremely damaging to a child's physical
and social well-being. Due in part to poor sanitation and pollution, and higher risk
for such medical problems as asthma, "central nervous system pathologies, devel-
opmental delays, failure to thrive, anemia, rickets, fetal alcohol syndrome,
malnutrition, parasites, exposure to syphilis, and tuberculosis," infectious diseases,
and motor problems. Furthermore, for every five months spent in an institution, the
average child will exhibit a one-month physical growth delay.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Strong, supra note 8, at 164 (describing "millions of children
[who] live in physical and psychological poverty in underfunded orphanages around the
world"); O'Keeffe, supra note 62, at 1635 (stating that at least 1 million children live on the
streets, begging and shining shoes, exposed to sexual abuse, drug addiction, and terrible health
conditions, and, if not on the streets, in delinquency homes or institutions and orphanages that
are overcrowded).
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Romania, and China's one-child policy. 12 These narratives portray in-
competent governments that create large populations of abandoned
children through population control policies. Despite the idiosyncratic
circumstances in which the Chinese and Romanian cases developed, a
telling of these cases generally precedes or is central to explanations of
why ICA is a humanitarian response to children's rights, thus negating
the need to discuss any alternative domestic placement option.
In legal scholarship, decisions by sending countries to restrict or op-
pose ICA are typically described as transgressions to children's rights,73
or overreactions of governments due to public shame, fear of imperial-
ism, nationalistic pride, or xenophobic attitudes toward Westerners .
72. On China's one-child policy, see, e.g., Johnson, supra note 8, at 379; Kimball, su-
pra note 62, at 579; Curtis Kleem, Airplane Trips and Organ Banks: Random Events and the
Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoptions, 28 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 319, 320-21
(2000); Van Leeuwen, supra note 8, at 193; Szejner, supra note 8, at 213; Fleisher, supra note
8, at 176; Foster, supra note 62, at 320; Gates, supra note 8, at 369-70; Zeppa, supra note 62,
at 167. On Nicolae Ceaulescu's anti-contraception and mandatory five-children-per-household
policies, see, e.g., Kales, supra note 8, at 483; Carrie A. Rankin, Romania's New Child Protec-
tion Legislation: Change in Intercountry Adoption Law Results in a Human Rights Violation,
34 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 259, 261 (2006); Steltzner, supra note 71, at 126-27; Ber-
ger, supra note 8, at 38; Marx, supra note 8, at 381-84. For a discussion of both China's and
Ceau~escu's policies, see, e.g., Wardle, supra note 8, at 340; Hubing, supra note 8, at 658-62;
O'Keeffe, supra note 62, at 1617, 1624; Ryan, supra note 8, at 359-62; Wallace, supra note
62, at 689-90, 713-16, 717-19.
73. See generally Rankin, supra note 72, at 280-82; Sohr, supra note 71, at 560-61;
Galit Avitan, Note, Protecting Our Children or Our Pride? Regulating the Intercountry Adop-
tion of American Children, 40 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 489 (2007) (critiquing even the United
States for creating obstacles for ICA of children in foster care); Bitzan, supra note 62, at 153-
54 (arguing that, notwithstanding Korea's intent to rely on domestic adoption, it should do so
without discontinuing ICA); Marx, supra note 8, at 397-403; Wittner, supra note 70, at 611-
18.
74. Bogard, supra note 6, at 580-81. Howard E. Bogard noted that
[m]any Third World countries, however, view [international adoption] as "imperial-
istic, self-serving, and a return to a form of colonialism." As such, the entire
practice has not escaped the prejudices accompanying internal adoption and is over-
shadowed by perceptions of national pride and a clash between the so-called "have"
and "have-not" countries.
Id. (citations omitted); see also Carlson, supra note 8, at 246; Dillon, supra note 8, at 187, 254
(stating that many ICA organizations, including UNICEF, have bought into arguments of na-
tionalism or imperialism, and consequently hurt children's rights); Hora, supra note 8, at
1035; Katz, supra note 8, at 283, 291-92; Van Leeuwen, supra note 8, at 202; Stark, Baby
Girls, supra note 8, at 1246-47 n.102; Wardle, supra note 8, at 350; Kimberly A. Chadwick,
Comment, The Politics and Economics of Intercountry Adoption in Eastern Europe, 5 J. INT'L
LEGAL STUD. 113, 114, 119 (1999); Gates, supra note 8, at 375, 391 (explaining that develop-
ing countries reject ICA because they feel publicly shamed that they cannot take care of their
own and that developing countries see ICA as exploitation and colonialism); Hubing, supra
note 8, at 660; Marx, supra note 8, at 377; McMillan, supra note 8, at 140 (arguing that the
"ethnocentric bias" of Latin American countries impedes ICA); Padilla, supra note 8, at 839
(finding that "nationalistic concerns" lead to arbitrary closing and opening of ICA).
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Several authors sustain this narrative by referencing two specific quota-
tions that demonstrate that countries view ICA as a shameful admission
of their incapacity or as an act of imperialism or colonialism. The quota-
tion typically referenced in discussions of the "shame" experienced by
sending countries is from Elizabeth Bartholet: "[Intercountry adoption is
a] shameful admission to the world of the government's inability to care
for its own, the loss of a vital national asset, and perhaps the ultimate
example of the exploitation by rich nations of the poor nations of the
world."75 Similarly, to make the point that sending countries view ICA as
an act of imperialism or colonialism, law review articles typically refer-
ence Howard Alstein & Rita Simon: "[W]hat the West has generally
viewed as charitable, humane-even noble-behavior, developing coun-
tries have come to define as imperialistic, self-serving, and a return to a
form of colonialism in which whites exploit and steal natural re-
sources." 76 None of the law review articles explicitly consider a post-
colonial critique; many, however, suggest that sending countries feel im-
posed on by wealthy Western countries through ICA.
Counternarratives:
Intercountry Adoption as Exploitation?
An alternative narrative to the dominant rescue narrative reveals
what has been described as the predatory nature of ICA.77 Today, ICA
surges after regime collapses and natural disasters in developing coun-
tries, precisely when institutions for child placement-formal and
informal-are at their weakest.78 Legal scholars rarely take the position
75. Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Overview, in ADOPTION LAW AND
POLICY § 10.04(1) (Joan Hollinger ed., 1988).
76. Howard Alstein & Rita J. Simon, Introduction to INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: A
MULTINATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 2 (Howard Altstein & Rita J. Simon eds., 1991).
77. Bhabha, supra note 8, at 183-84 (contending that ICA is motivated by "predatory
globalization" and explaining that the very fine line between coercion and consent of birth
parents in ICA is often trespassed); Graff, supra note 8, at 411. Graff noted,
Guatemala is upon the adoption world stage now much in the same way Romania
was in the early 1990s. The focus of the U.S. hunger for foreign babies is currently
trained with full force upon Guatemala. The consequences of this are already being
felt. Mothers are being exploited. Mass numbers of children are simply being sold
to the highest bidder. A recognized, international crisis is upon Guatemala. The is-
sue is how a poor and governmentally unstable country such as Guatemala can
defend itself from the rapacious needs of American baby consumers. Irrespective of
the number of Guatemalans intimately involved in and financially benefiting from
the illicit trade in babies, Guatemala will eventually be forced to protect its chil-
dren.
Id.
78. See, e.g., Strong, supra note 8, at 170 ("Recent events such as the war in Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the famine in Somalia, and the AIDS epidemic in Uganda have increased the
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that ICA should be the option of last resort for children in the developing
world. Little attention is paid in legal scholarship, for example, to the
argument that industrialized countries are exploiting developing coun-
tries and stealing their national resources, i.e., their healthy children.
Similarly, scholars do not often discuss how the rescue rhetoric
might play into the psychological process for adoptive parents of clean-
sing the foreign child of "otherness" and redefining belonging and origin
through citizenship. 79 Legal scholars actively promote the notion that the
younger children should be taken away from their country conditions as
soon as possible, in order to avoid mental and physical problems that
develop with age.8° This, in turn, creates an urgency to extract infants and
number of older children ... [and] infants[] available for adoption"); Kimball, supra note 62,
at 561 ("In response to the disaster [of the tsunami in Southeast Asia on December 26, 2004],
Americans have flooded the U.S. Department of State with phone calls and letters voicing
interest in adopting Tsunami orphans." (internal citation omitted)). Kimball wrote that
[a]s history shows, intercountry adoption is at its peak when world disasters, wars,
and other economic or political changes occur because richer and more stable coun-
tries have families who want to try to rescue children from the plight of poverty and
instability. These disasters and situations of turmoil make it extremely difficult for
affected countries to support their children, thus forcing them to allow their children
to be internationally adopted.
Id. at 581 (internal citation omitted); see also McMillan, supra note 8, at 142-43, 145 (finding
that ICA in Romania and Russia surged with the collapse of the communist governments);
Ryan, supra note 8, at 353-55 (reporting that after the 2004 Tsunami and the 60 Minutes spe-
cial report on Romanian orphanages, adoption agencies were deluged with phone calls). Ryan
stated,
However impractical the rush of adoption interests may be after a disaster such as
the 2004 tsunami, it is not a new phenomenon, and it arises most every time a po-
litical crisis or national disaster brings images of forlorn children to the forefront
.... But while times of political and social crises tend to peak interest in (and pro-
vide extensive media coverage of) international adoptions, such adoption is a
common and everyday practice among dozens of nations.
Id. at 354-55.
79. See generally Ratna Kapur, The Citizen and the Migrant: Postcolonial Anxieties,
Law, and the Politics of Exclusion/Inclusion, 8 THEORETICAL INQUIRIEs L. 537 (2007) (dis-
cussing the use of citizenship in the prevailing world order for laundering migrants into
national discourses, and arguing that current understandings of citizenship are based on nor-
mative criteria that have their origins in colonialism and thus in the "dominant racial, sexual,
and cultural norms").
80. See, e.g., Steltzner, supra note 71, at 130, 152 (noting that while "[m]ost of the
physical defects ... can often be treated by Western medicine," many "mental and psycho-
logical traumas ... are more difficult to diagnose, and, if severe, may be nearly impossible to
cure .... The longer a child is in an orphanage, the more his or her cognitive abilities de-
crease, and the more developmental and behavior disorders become apparent."). A strong
proponent of international adoption, Wardle noted that
a wealth of social science research supports imitative adoption. Numerous studies
report that children adopted at birth are at least as likely to live with two parents in
a middle-class family; to do as well or better in both school and in social compe-
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young children from the developing world. This could also be character-
ized as the desire for a clean slate: a baby or young child unconditioned
by his or her native environment. And, after a "quick extraction," the
ICA bureaucracies allow the infant or child adoptee to gain expeditious
citizenship in the United States, which completes the process of "laun-
dering" the child for the parents who may desire an unadulterated
newborn child. This is why, in part, Stephanie Sue Padilla describes ICA
as "this most intimate aspect of our lives-the rebirth of a child into a
family."8' From this alternative perspective, the Rescue Narrative facili-
tates the "laundering" of children as infants, and their "rebirth," into an
adoptive family.
As noted above, when sending governments oppose or restrict ICA,
their actions are interpreted as responding to public shame, nationalistic
pride, or xenophobia. These narratives, although meant by authors as
apolitical or neutral summaries of opposing arguments, anthropomor-
phize governments by attributing emotional or irrational qualities to their
decisions about how to handle child placement domestically. This de-
scription contrasts sharply with arguments that ICA is the logical,
rational, or efficient solution to the "demand" for adoptable children by
Western adults, or to the argument that these children are in need of be-
ing rescued.
Another prevalent narrative is that sending countries place bans on
ICA that are unfounded; this narrative prevails despite the fact that send-
ing countries (and the United States as a receiving country) impose bans
or moratoria on ICA due to serious incidents of child trafficking.82 Child
tency tests; are generally less depressed, more optimistic; appear to have higher
self-esteem, self-confidence, and feelings of security; more willing to give volun-
tary service; are less involved in alcohol or drug use, theft, weapons or police
trouble; enjoy similar or better health; achieve higher educational attainments; and
have fewer mental health problems as children living with their birth parents.
Wardle, supra note 8, at 370 (citing Patrick Fagan, Adoption: The Best Option, in III AoP-
TION FACTBOOK 2 (Connaught Marshner & William L. Pierce eds., 1999)).
81. Padilla, supra note 8, at 844.
82. See id. at 838 (noting that the U.S. Department of State "expressed concern over 'an
increasing incidence of illicit activities in the area of international adoption' [sic]" (quoting
Romanian Adoptions, 1991: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on International Law, Immigration
and Refugees of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. 13, 258 (1991)); Blair, supra note
8, at 373; Banks, supra note 62, at 46-47 ("Some commentators perceive accounts of illegal
adoption as exaggerated, but statistics showing the number of children exported, and detailed
descriptions of child procurement schemes, rebut this opinion. The UNICEF Report and Sale
of Children Report reveal an absence of effective monitoring over international adoptions
.(internal citation omitted)). Blair stated,
The global scope of trafficking was perhaps best illuminated by Ethica, a non-profit
organization promoting ethical adoption practices. In 2003, Ethica reported that, of
the forty nations that had made the top twenty list of nations sending children to the
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trafficking occurs when children who would otherwise not be adoptable,
are bought, sold, stolen, or purposefully lost into the limbo of middle-
men and institutions that facilitate ICA. Reports of child trafficking from
sending countries are often qualified in law review articles as "rumors
of," "scandals of," "tales of," and at times are explicitly described as mis-
representations or exaggerations by the media of sending countries that
hurt children who need adoption." The terms used in law review articles
United States for adoption within the previous fifteen years, 43% were temporarily
or effectively closed to intercountry adoption. Most of these closures, Ethica
suggested, were prompted by concerns on the part of sending or receiving nations,
or both, related to abduction, trafficking, and corruption.
Id. (internal citations omitted); see also D'Amato, supra note 6, at 1247; Kleem, supra note
72, at 329-32 (noting that "[t]he third factor that may lead China to restrict its international
adoptions is the negative activities associated with the practice. These include child selling and
abduction, financial exploitation by professionals who work in the field, and other random
acts that are reported in the media" and describing child-selling and child-buying incidents in
China, Taiwan, Romania, and Canada); Liu, supra note 8, at 204-05 (describing the Romanian
government's imposition of a ban against international adoption in an effort to curb "illegal
child trade" achieved through black market adoptions); Maskew, supra note 8, at 621-25 (dis-
cussing the U.S. suspension of adoptions from Cambodia due to allegations of trafficking in
human beings); Carlberg, supra note 62, at 145-46 (discussing the hold Vietnam placed on
ICA from Vietnam due to numerous incidents of child trafficking, yet describing the cessation
of adoption as "unfortunate," as children continue to need homes); Chadwick, supra note 74,
at 121, 124-25 (finding that Russia and Romania imposed moratoria on ICA due to baby
smuggling incidents); Gates, supra note 8, at 386-87 (finding that Chinese laws were re-
formed to facilitate ICA in order to "eliminate black market adoptions," but instead, adoptive
parents continued to circumvent laws by directly contacting birth parents for "buying and
smuggling a child.., out of China"); Jennifer M. Lippold, Note, Transnational Adoption from
an American Perspective: The Need for Universal Uniformity, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
465, 486-87 (1995); O'Keeffe, supra note 62, at 1619-24 (providing examples of child traf-
ficking in Peru, Romania, India, Cambodia, and Guatemala that forced these countries to
reform their adoption laws); Wittner, supra note 70, at 600-02 (narrating instances in Cambo-
dia, Romania, and Guatemala in which crises of baby-selling overwhelmed any effort to curb
illicit practices, leading inevitably to restrictions and moratoria on ICA).
83. See, e.g., Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: Propriety, Prospects and
Pragmatics, 13 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 181, 199 (1996) [hereinafter Bartholet, Pro-
priety] (acknowledging "some documented instances of kidnappings and of improper
payments to birth parents" but denying that such instances are widespread and asserting that
"[c]urrent law makes it extremely risky for adoption intermediaries and would-be adopters to
engage in baby buying or kidnapping"); Carlson, supra note 8, at 246, 257 ("Some of the
opposition to intercountry adoption is blindly nationalistic, oblivious to the interests of chil-
dren, and armed with sensational exaggerations of the extent of illicit baby-selling
operations."); Hillis, supra note 62, at 240 ("[Tlhe allegation that intercountry adoption serves
as a front for black market baby-sellers has created more obstacles for intercountry adoptive
parents to surmount."); Katz, supra note 8, at 292; Liu, supra note 8, at 204; Wardle, supra
note 8, at 347 (arguing that concerns about baby selling are "exaggerated," "given greatly
exaggerated air time by the sensationalizing media ... and . . . excessive attention by profit
seeking media producers"); Berger, supra note 8, at 38-39, 52 (using the word "alleged" to
describe baby selling and arguing that ICA should not be curtailed because of exaggerated
media reports of baby selling); Chadwick, supra note 74, at 121; D'Amato, supra note 6, at
1245; Marx, supra note 8, at 395-96; McMillan, supra note 8, at 140-41.
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to describe these claims imply that reports of child trafficking are not
real or are unreliable. While it may be true that illegal practices are diffi-
cult to trace, and that bans on ICA may adversely affect some children,
denying the existence of pervasive tactics of child trafficking is a narra-
tive that is not nuanced enough to reflect reality.i4
There are only a few legal scholars who articulate positive counter-
narratives about sending governments. One looks at China as an unusual
sending country that has deliberately guided population growth and ICA
policies to suit its national interest.85 Another reviews changes in Korean
policies to show that restrictions on ICA seem inevitable in the future, as
the country exerts a stronger economic position and has explicitly stated
86its desire to replace intercountry adoption with in-country caregiving.
In these alternative narratives, sending governments are portrayed as re-
sponsible governments in control of their future, doing their best to
address population needs, which includes caring for their children.
Aside from these few cases, next-generation ICA narratives rely
heavily on an "othering process" that describes sending countries and
sending governments in negative contrast to a "history" of humanitarian-
ism of the West, and as antipodes to Western rationality, wealth, culture,
and the rule of law. The dominant Rescue Narrative betrays a hegemonic
and imperialist hue fraught with distortion. This distorted view fails to
take these children in the context in which they come, but instead sug-
gests that all "third-world" children are in dire need of being rescued.
3. Narrative Three: Improved Life Chances Narrative
Related to the Rescue Narrative is the Improved Life Chances Narra-
tive. Invariably, legal scholars describe the opportunities for adoptive
children as improved in the United States, and in doing so, imply the
superiority of upper- and middle-class parents to poor birth parents.87
84. Blair argues that ICA advocates would do best to accept that illegal practices are
occurring, since ignoring child trafficking for adoption is a main reason for the shutting down
of ICA by major sending countries. Blair, supra note 8, at 402. Blair states,
Advocates of intercountry adoption ignore the incidence of systemic trafficking and
displacement of domestic adoption occurring during the past decade at their peril.
Exposure of systemic trafficking and displacement problems in countries such as
Cambodia, India, Guatemala, and Romania bring intercountry adoption into disre-
pute, fuel the arguments of those who are simply opposed to intercountry adoption
on political or philosophical grounds, and spur new moratoria by both sending and
receiving nations.
Id.
85. Luo & Smolin, supra note 8, at 607-10; see also Stark, Baby Girls, supra note 8.
86. See Bitzan, supra note 62.
87. I discuss the portrayal of birth parents and adoptive parents specifically in the fol-
lowing Section, in which I discuss the Invisible Birth Parents Narrative.
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Scholars routinely explain that intercountry adoption offers hope to chil-
dren of improving their life chances, often of escaping a life "marred by
poverty," and provides them with increased educational and employment
opportunities."' Similarly, scholars routinely contrast, either explicitly or
implicitly, the lack of opportunity in developing countries with the abun-
dant opportunity in the United States, which is reflected in modern
conveniences, better educational institutions, and Western medicine.89
The United States, the dominant narrative suggests, unconditionally pro-
vides better opportunities for children from developing countries.
Counternarratives:
The Post-American World
There is surely a humanitarian aspect to many intercountry adop-
tions. Obviously, there are children who, if not adopted, would have a
very bleak life and few opportunities in their countries. But, legal schol-
ars tend to describe all sending countries as poor, impoverished countries
that are bereft of opportunity, and all parents and caregivers from these
countries as unable to care for their children. The reality is more nuanced
than these scholars would suggest. Scholars rarely mention that the
countries from which people adopt are not exclusively impoverished, or,
in fact, that China and Russia, the two leading "sending" countries, have
recently experienced consistent economic growth. In particular, China,
the largest sending country, has been described as an economic power-
house. 90 In fact, in 2005, the National Science Foundation published a
88. See Szejner, supra note 8, at 212 (noting that "a great many [adoptive parents] are
also motivated by a desire to raise children whose lives would otherwise be profoundly marred
by poverty, disease, war, homelessness, or discrimination in their countries of origin based on
their ethnoracial background or religion." (quoting Joan H. Hollinger, Intercountry Adoption:
A Frontier Without Boundaries, in FAMILIES BY LAW: AN ADOPTION READER 215, 215 (Naomi
R. Cahn & Joan H. Hollinger eds., 2004))); see also Bitzan, supra note 62, at 142 (noting that
"[d]ue to the lack of a known bloodline, these children are without the strong personal identity
of a family group and are denied the benefits of a family name in seeking education, employ-
ment opportunities, and marriage"); Carlberg, supra note 62, at 144 ("During this time, the
citizens of Vietnam experienced political and economic turmoil that resulted in dreadful living
conditions, which in turn led to many families turning to adoption with the hope that their
children would have a better life."); see also Berger, supra note 8, at 40; Root, supra note 8, at
353.
89. See, e.g., Martin, supra note 8, at 181 (noting that one argument for ICA is that
"intercountry adoption alleviates the world's ills by taking children away from countries with
overtaxed resources and reducing the overall number of homeless children"); Steltzner, supra
note 71, at 129 (describing health care available to children in orphanage systems in Russia
and Romania as "what would be considered malpractice in the United States"); Berger, supra
note 8; Chadwick, supra note 74, at 119 ("Arguably, a Western lifestyle of material security,
with access to modern conveniences, higher education, and advanced medicine could be
viewed as a beneficial choice."); see also Wardle, supra note 8, at 342-43.
90. FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD 89 (2008).
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much discussed report that highlighted the large number of engineers
educated in China as compared to in the United States.9' Clearly, the
story of impoverished sending countries that do not have the capacity to
care for their children and that have sub-standard educational and eco-
nomic opportunities is incomplete. In fact, little attention is paid to the
fact that the poorest nations of the world fail to play a significant part in
the intercountry adoption process. 92
Legal scholars also pay little attention to countries that have turned
to in-country placement as the preferred solution for children in need.93
While Brazil, for example, was fourth among the countries from which
children were adopted by U.S. parents by the end of the 1970s, by 1994,
intercountry adoption had slowed to a "trickle." 94 Scholars have attrib-
uted this slow-down to the poor finding creative ways in which to evade
interventionist adoption policies and to continue to employ local prac-
tices and customs for child care.9 The fact that children who would
previously have been international adoptees are being raised in Brazil,
because, in part, of the perception of many Brazilian families that their
own "patterns of shared parenthood" are the optimal solution for these
children, reveals a more nuanced narrative than one of increased life op-
portunities in which Western adults provide non-Western children with
what the dominant narrative would suggest is the winning lottery ticket
of "improved life chances."
4. Narrative Four: The Invisible Birth Parents Narrative
Another contemporary narrative derives from the failure to acknowl-
edge birth parents. If birth parents are acknowledged in the literature at
all, references typically contextualize them as dead, sick, incapacitated,
impoverished, desperate, neglectful, addicted to drugs and alcohol, or
shamed into abandoning their children. 96  Legal scholars often
91. NAT'L SCI. FOUND., RISING ABOVE THE GATHERING STORM: ENERGIZING AND
EMPLOYING AMERICA FOR A BRIGHTER ECONOMIC FUTURE 16 (2007). While there was a dis-
pute as to which professionals were classified as "engineers" in this report, it is clear that a
large percentage of engineers educated globally in 2004 were educated in China.
92. Selman, supra note 12, at 14; Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 9, at 126-27
(finding that the "incidence of extreme poverty is not in and of itself predictive of child laun-
dering problems").
93. Claudia Fonseca, Patterns of Shared Parenthood Among the Brazilian Poor, in
CULTURES OF TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION 142 (Toby Alice Volkman ed., 2005) [hereinafter
Fonseca, Patterns].
94. Id. at 142.
95. Fonseca, Inequality, supra note 9, at 420-22.
96. Laura Beth Daly introduced the following narrative to describe birth parents them-
selves as utterly helpless:
Imagine being 12 years old, pregnant, unmarried, and living in impoverished condi-
tions in the isolated countryside of Guatemala. Your only desire is to be able to
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characterize adoptive parents as victims, whose best interest is to stream-
line ICA procedures.97 Similarly, one author flatly states that what is in
the best interest of adoptive parents is in the best interest of the child.98
Western adoptive parents are often generously described as loving, hu-
manitarian, wealthy, and resourceful caregivers, ready to travel to the
ends of the world to save a child. 9
Counternarratives:
The "Othering" of Birth Parents
Too few legal scholars take on the challenge of seeing ICA from the
perspective of poor birth parents, who may have been enticed, coerced,
provide a loving, healthy, and safe environment in which your child can grow up,
but given your age and lack of resources .. . [y]ou are being forced to sell your
newborn baby because you have no other viable options.
Laura Beth Daly, Note, To Regulate or Not to Regulate: The Need for Compliance with Inter-
national Norms by Guatemala and Cooperation by the United States in Order to Maintain
Intercountry Adoptions, 45 FAM. CT. REV. 620, 620 (2007); see, e.g., Katz, supra note 8, at
287 (finding that adults in developing countries are disinterested, incapable, or too impover-
ished to adopt children); Carlberg, supra note 62, at 121 (explaining that in Vietnam, "the
incentives for trading human life have become too high for some biological parents to
forego"); Chadwick, supra note 74, at 118 (observing that birth parents are "dead" or have
abandoned their children and that if they are alive, they are "unable to care for their children
because they [are] involved with drugs, alcohol, prostitution, are unemployed, imprisoned, or
institutionalized in a mental asylum"); Hubing, supra note 8, at 657-58; Wittner, supra note
70, at 603-06 (finding that birth parents' vulnerability to traffickers is due to being poor, un-
educated, ignorant, and desperate); see also Bogard, supra note 6, at 572, 574-75 (neglect and
abandonment); Van Leeuwen, supra note 8, at 193, 194 (socio-economic conditions); Martin,
supra note 8, at 177 (cultural values); Steltzner, supra note 71, at 124 (social stigma of chil-
dren with disabilities); Berger, supra note 8, at 52 (indigence); Wallace, supra note 62, at 689,
694 (shame, poverty, and war). But see Root, supra note 8, at 323-24 (explaining that the
public perception of Angelina Jolie's adoption of an African child as positive and Madonna's
adoption of a Malawian child as negative was the consequence of differences in law and expo-
sure by the press that Madonna's child had a father who kept occasional contact with him).
Thus, the difference between the Madonna and Jolie adoptions is interesting not only because
it acknowledges birth parents, but also because it is an example of an "orphan" narrative that
is broken, and consequently shatters the illusion of humanitarianism.
97. Kales, supra note 8, at 481, 484 (explaining that, in their "desperation for a child,
[adoptive parents] may fall victim to unscrupulous intermediaries," and that Westerners
"poured into Romania to rescue the impoverished Romanian children, but often fell victim to
baby-selling schemes"); see also Liu, supra note 8, at 189-90 (observing that a large number
of adoptive parents who are "willing to travel to the four comers of the world" are often de-
nied access to children).
98. Steltzner, supra note 71, at 115-16.
99. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 8, at 292-93 (describing adoptive parents as affluent
people who can pay large sums of money); Berger, supra note 8, at 52 (contrasting wealthy
adoptive parents with indigent biological parents); Gates, supra note 8, at 370 (claiming that
American adoptive couples are "compelled" to save children from war, famine, and other
disasters); see also Liu, supra note 8, at 190-91; Kleiman, supra note 8, at 333; Wittner, supra
note 70, at 598.
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or tricked into relinquishing birth rights.' °° Instead, birth parents undergo
an "othering process" in which they are unworthy of keeping their chil-
dren, or willingly relinquish their rights for a few bucks. Narratives of
deliberate relinquishment of a child create a morally ambiguous uni-
verse, which has the effect of portraying birth parents as selfish, while at
the same time failing to address how a mother who loves her child could
bear to part from him.'0 '
In contrast, very few argue in favor of supporting birth families as a
better option for children, over ICA. '°2 Few recognize that there are chil-
dren in poor countries who may benefit most from staying with their
families, within their communities and their culture, rather than being
uprooted in order to satisfy the desires and imaginations of Western
adults. In this regard, a very important debate led by critical gender and
race theorists on transracial adoption in the United States barely makes a
dent in the analysis of ICA.0 3 When intercountry adoption is discussed in
100. For examples of authors who have taken on the challenge of introducing the per-
spective of poor birth parents into the debate, see Bhabha, supra note 8, at 186-87
(deconstructing the narrative of birth mothers who give away their children, observing that
they are often coerced (even by their husbands) to give away their child for money); Kathleen
L. Manley, Comment, Birth Parents: The Forgotten Members of the International Adoption
Triad, 35 CAP. U. L. REV. 627, 628-29 (2006) (concluding that "birth parents may be misin-
formed in the process of international adoption, and it is very difficult for them to remedy
fraud or deceit" and that "the black market prevails in the international adoption arena, and
many birth parents feel pressured into selling their children 'for a better life' without fully
understanding the consequences").
101. Yngvesson describes this "othering process" thusly:
The fascination this story evokes-its representation of a selfless mother who gives
her child away in order to create a family for him-is an effect of its moral ambigu-
ity for the educated, white, middle-class audiences to whom it is directed. A mother
who gives away her child is unthinkable. She gives the child away because she
loves it so much, the story and its accompanying image imply; but the unspoken
subtext-If she really loved the child, how could she bear to part from it?-is no
less powerful a message in a moral economy in which becoming a woman is in-
separable from the work of motherhood and the assumptions about nurturance this
implies.
Yngvesson, Placing the "Gift Child", supra note 8, at 228.
102. See, e.g., Root, supra note 8, at 339, 342 (taking the position that "support should
be found for parents and extended family to enable them to care for [their] child before resort-
ing to intercountry adoption" due, in part, to a desire to protect parental rights, keep the
"healthiest and the brightest" within their countries of origin, avoid a potential loss of identity
to Western society, and protect against child trafficking).
103. Twila L. Perry, The Transracial Adoption Controversy: An Analysis of Discourse
and Subordination, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 33, 38-41, 40-41, 55-56, 59-61, 68-
69 (1994) (summarizing the domestic transracial adoption debate by exploring two different
perspectives promoted by legal scholars: "liberal colorblind individualism" and "color and
community consciousness"). Perry argues that "liberal colorblind individualism" sustains
"subordination of Black communities, Black families, Black women, and Black children" by
choosing to be blind to the realities of racism and oppression that Black families face. Legal
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this context, it is to partially attribute the surge in ICA to problems faced
by white Americans in adopting interracially. '04 As a general matter,
some authors promote ICA as a means by which to avoid domestic re-
quirements that would disqualify adoptive parents under U.S. laws and
practices. 1
05
5. Narrative Five: The Natural "Market" for
Intercountry Adoption Narrative
War-orphan rescue rhetorics have been "substituted" for a more gen-
eral narrative about rescuing children from the developing world. These
new ICA narratives observe a rising supply of orphans in developing
countries since the 1970s. I place the word "orphans" in quotation marks
here because any child living without an ideal family environment
in developing countries has come to be identified as an orphan in these
narratives. Law review articles create this narrative by freely interchang-
ing the word "orphan" with "abandoned," "street," "homeless," and
"needy."' ' The dominant narrative in law review articles suggests that an
perspectives favoring "colorblind individualism" render Black families powerless in deciding
the placement of Black children, and reinforce a lesser value of Black children by continu-
ously placing a premium on white babies. Perry favors "color and community consciousness"
by arguing that only an exercise in consciousness of class and community dilemmas faced by
Blacks can lead to adequate consideration of the duress faced by Black families and their
communities in preserving group identity and culture in an environment of racism and oppres-
sion. Id.
104. On ICA as a response to domestic adoption laws, see generally Fleisher, supra note
8; see also Padilla, supra note 8, at 821-23.
105. See, e.g., Zeppa, supra note 62, at 185 ("Intercountry adoption is a viable solution
for white couples open to interracial adoption but frustrated by domestic adoption practices, in
other words, race-conscious adoption laws and racially conscious practices of private adoption
agencies."). See generally Hillis, supra note 62.
106. See, e.g., Blair, supra note 8, at 349, 359-60 (speaking of the orphaned children
around the world, but also providing information about the case of an adoption handler who
confessed to misrepresenting children as orphans); D'Amato, supra note 6, at 1239, 1241-42
(describing Vietnamese orphans as "unwanted children" and "street children"); Katz, supra
note 8, at 286, 292, 294 (using the terms "orphans" "children who grow up without homes or
decent food and shelter," and "abandoned children"); Van Leeuwen, supra note 8, at 191, 194
(using the terms "lost and abandoned overseas" and "orphans"); Strong, supra note 8, at 167,
173-74 (referring to children as orphans even as she acknowledges that the definition varies
and is mostly contingent on whether a parent has given consent); Wardle, supra note 8, at
323-24 (expanding the definition of orphan by using the word "parentless," where
"[p]arentlessness refers to the condition of children who lack the present and long-term care
and direction of their parents"); Berger, supra note 8, at 36 (describing children in Romania as
"homeless children"); Chadwick, supra note 74, at 118, 120, 130 (describing abandoned chil-
dren, orphans of Eastern Europe, "neglected children of communism," and acknowledging that
"orphans" in orphanages in Georgia often have parents); Gates, supra note 8, at 369, 370, 376;
Lippold, supra note 82, at 469 (describing adoptable children in Romania as "poor and war-
stricken orphans"); McMillan, supra note 8, at 137, 143, 163-64 (using the terms "children in
need of homes," "orphans," "unwanted children," and "homeless needy children"); Padilla,
supra note 8, at 817 (using the term "alien orphans"); Wallace, supra note 62, at 689 (explain-
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expanding discourse of who is adoptable has broadened the conception
of who is adoptable.
The constant reference in these articles to children as "orphans" re-
flects what was a legal idiosyncrasy in U.S. immigration law. For many
years, in fact, there has been a requirement that potential adoptees be
classified as "orphans" under U.S. immigration law, even when the send-
ing country has defined that child as an adoptable child.'0 7
Notwithstanding the fact that some authors maintain that ethical
adoption only involves genuine "orphans,"'' 8 most proponents of inter-
country adoption have criticized the government's "very restrictive"
definition of "orphan" as limited and harmful to children's best inter-
ests.' °9 In fact, "the best interest of the child" has been taken by many
scholars as a favored standard to reframe the question of who is adopt-
able. Similarly, the 1993 Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption"0
is widely promoted by law review articles, notwithstanding the fact that
the Convention favors placement out of a child's home country even if
ing that children in ICA are sometimes orphaned by poverty or cultural factors and using the
terms "orphaned" and "abandoned" interchangeably).
107. 8 U.S.C. § I 101(b)(1)(F) (defining an orphan as a child who has suffered "the death
or disappearance of, abandonment or desertion by, or separation or loss from, both parents, or
for whom the sole or surviving parent is incapable of providing the proper care and has in
writing irrevocably released the child for emigration and adoption"); see also Hubing, supra
note 8, at 686-87. On Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) definitions in U.S. law,
see also Maskew, supra note 8, at 620-25; Carlberg, supra note 62, at 128, 139; Fleisher,
supra note 8, at 177-78, 187-88; Lippold, supra note 82, at 482; McMillan, supra note 8, at
148-49; Padilla, supra note 8, at 830-31,837-38; Ryan, supra note 8, at 372-73.
108. Dillon, supra note 8, at 187-88 (coining the term the "adoptability conundrum" to
refer to the difficulty of identifying children who would have been without family care in the
absence of a system of ICA, and recognizing the need for "an empirically oriented, rigorous,
objective search to identify who is in the public or group child care systems of each country,
how they got there, and what options are truly (not just in the realm of ideological speculation)
available to them"); Maskew, supra note 8, at 619 (writing about the problem of misdefining
"orphans" and insisting on the importance of assuring that a child is adoptable); Witner, supra
note 70, at 595 (explaining the problem of defining who is adoptable as the difference between
"genuine orphans or future baby-trafficking victims"). Similarly, Manley suggests that the law
does not sufficiently protect the rights of birth parents, and, by implication, the rights of some
children who are not "genuine orphans." Manley, supra note 100, at 633 ("[U.S.] law makes it
nearly impossible for a foreign birth parent who has been subjected to illegal or fraudulent
practices to assert his or her rights, as this body of law is designed to cut all ties between the
birth parent and the adoptee.").
109. See, e.g., Berger, supra note 8, at 44, 65 (advocating the use of a "'best interests of
the child' test" for granting U.S. visas to adopted children instead of the restrictive "orphan"
test that is currently used); see also Padilla, supra note 8, at 844 (arguing for the same).
110. Hague Conference on Private International Law, Convention on Protection of Chil-
dren and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, May 29, 1993, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 105-51, 1870 U.N.T.S. 182 [hereinafter Hague Convention].
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there are established caregiving networks in-country."' Pursuant to the
favored Hague Convention, if a family does not adopt a child domesti-
cally, ICA is favored as the next option over domestic solutions for
placement in orphanages, group homes, other institutions, or other care-
giving networks that may not meet a Western definition of family.
The vast majority of scholars propose reforms to domestic and inter-
national law in order to streamline or facilitate ICA."' Similarly, most
111. See, e.g., Gates, supra note 8, at 380-83 (arguing that the Hague Convention is an
improvement over the other conventions because it establishes the "permanent family" as the
reigning principle). Graff similarly argued that
[t]he Hague Convention has clearly remedied the textual flaws of the CRC. The
Hague Convention does not make the mistake of according the family unit superior
rights to the child. It further makes intercountry adoption a viable and more readily
reached option for child care placement. By placing this stamp of legitimization
upon intercountry adoption, the Hague Convention created in itself the power to
regulate and control the practice. The CRC, in denying intercountry adoption as a
viable second tier child placement choice, in effect disempowered itself.
Graff, supra note 8, at 425-26.
112. Bogard, supra note 6, at 612-16 (promoting a global legal definition of "orphan"
that is as broad and encompassing as possible, in order to apply to all situations in which a
child may lack an ideal family unit); Carlson, supra note 8, at 292 (concluding that the United
States should implement domestic regulations in order to streamline the ICA process); Kales,
supra note 8, at 493-94 (acknowledging that adoption agencies have been at the center of
many ICA abuses, but arguing that the accreditation process required under the Intercountry
Adoption Act (IAA) could put many adoption agencies out of business and suggesting that
accreditation should not be demanded of these agencies); Kleem, supra note 72, at 347-48
(acknowledging the many abuses that surround ICA, but concluding that the best solution is
for the United States to ratify the Hague Convention, and to create an incentive for as many
sending countries as possible to ratify the same, primarily by reforming it to allow sending
countries to opt out of certain terms); Van Leeuwen, supra note 8, at 217-18 (suggesting the
importance of ratification and implementation of the Hague Convention, as well as reform of
the Hague Convention in order to streamline ICA processes); Steltzner, supra note 71, at 116
(calling for the best interests of adoptive parents in ICA to be protected by looking at con-
sumer remedies and wrongful adoption suits, and proposing several legal reforms in order to
protect adoptive parents' rights in both intercountry and domestic adoptions); Banks, supra
note 62, at 50-56 (suggesting that the United States and Guatemala should sign a bilateral
treaty to sustain ICA); Lippold, supra note 82, at 489, 499, 503 (proposing that the Hague
Convention be modified to better protect the rights of adoptive parents); O'Keeffe, supra note
62, at 1611 (arguing that the United States' ratification of the Hague Convention through the
implementation of the IAA will only ensure safe ICA from sending countries that are also
parties to the Hague Convention; and suggesting reforms to the IAA in order to allow adop-
tions from sending countries that are not members of the Hague Convention under comparable
standards of safe adoption); Zeppa, supra note 62, at 182-85 (proposing that all countries
should implement the Hague Convention, but urging the United States to set an example by
establishing domestic legislation that would streamline the domestic side of ICA, including
expanding its definition of "orphan" to include other children who could require ICA).
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authors advocate ratifying, implementing, or improving the Hague Con-
vention."'
Only a handful of law review articles provide alternative narratives
to dominant narratives regarding ICA,"4 argue against ICA,"' propose
alternative solutions that seek to address underlying issues and causes of
child displacement,"6 discuss transracial and transcultural issues in the
practice of child placement," 7 argue for increased criminalization of
child trafficking," 8 or focus on the coercion of birth parents for purposes
of ICA." 9
113. See, e.g., Hague Convention, supra note 110; Blair, supra note 8; Carlson, supra
note 8; Dillon, supra note 8; Kimball, supra note 62; Martin, supra note 8; Sargent, supra note
8; Szejner, supra note 8.
114. See generally Bhabha, supra note 8, at 195-96 (arguing that ignoring the human
cost of policies and practices prompting and promoting ICA is extremely problematic and will
be best countered through full commitments to gender justice and democratic change); John-
son, supra note 8, at 379, 382-83, 394 (reviewing the Chinese one-child policy and related
politics of ICA, noting the unfortunate effect of population planning policies and ICA on tra-
ditional forms of adoption in Chinese culture, and disrupting the commonly held narrative that
the Chinese are not willing to adopt domestically or adopt girls); Liu, supra note 8, at 212
(noting and predicting a decrease in ICA due to improved economic conditions in "countries
that have traditionally 'supplied' the children" and that, "[i]ncreasingly, orphans who remain
in their motherland become members of their society as they are cared for by government
personnel or by native adoptive parents" (emphasis added)); Luo & Smolin, supra note 8, at
616-17 (exploring the possibilities of implementing a foster care system instead of ICA in
China as a primary solution to the "orphan" population provoked by government policy and
suggesting that, as China solves its economic problems, it will probably be in a singular posi-
tion to back away from its role as a sending country); Yngvesson, Placing the "Gift Child",
supra note 8 (examining the discourse of "giving up" or "abandoning" a child versus "giving"
or "placing" a child and viewing the insistence on "placement" as an attempt to escape (un-
successfully) the problems of commodifying a child through adoption).
115. See, e.g., Kleiman, supra note 8, at 368 (concluding that the United States should
focus its efforts on improving domestic conditions for displaced children before engaging
resources to facilitate and improve ICA); Root, supra note 8, at 324-25, 353-54 (comparing
two celebrity adoptions and one resulting scandal, and concluding that assistance to families
and communities that give up their children should be emphasized over ICA); Wallace, supra
note 62, at 722-23 (arguing that ICA is only a temporary solution that is exacerbating the
long-term problems associated with child placement and ICA).
116. See, e.g., Kleiman, supra note 8, at 368; Root, supra note 8, at 324-25, 353-54;
Wallace, supra note 62, at 722-23.
117. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 6, at 688-89 (describing the debate that surrounded
transracial adoption in the United States and that led to the elimination of the consideration of
race in child placement and observing similar practices in ICA in which the argument that a
child needs a loving home trumps alternative considerations about how minority communities
could care for their own children); Stark, Baby Girls, supra note 8 (illustrating that adult nar-
ratives do not address the identity formation processes of the Chinese "baby girl" adoptees
who will develop their own narratives and disrupt the narratives that they have been told).
118. See, e.g., Maskew, supra note 8, at 638 (arguing for increased safeguards for birth
parents, with a particular focus on child trafficking).
119. Id.
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Since the United States' ratification of the Hague Convention
through the Intercountry Adoption Act (IAA),'2° restrictive definitions of
adoptable children have been avoided. Under the IAA, any adoptee from
a signatory country to the Hague Convention may automatically enter
the United States and obtain an expedited process of naturalization.
Thus, U.S. law has been modified to accommodate the demand for an
expanded definition of "orphan." Undoubtedly, the pressure will now be
for countries from the developing world to sign and ratify the Hague
Convention and to expedite procedures as much as possible so that chil-
dren arrive young to their new adoptive homes.
An expanded definition of "orphan" creates the myth of an over-
abundant supply of adoptable children. On the demand side of ICA, law
review articles consistently tell the same story of scarcity of children in
the United States and other Western States. Adoptable children in the
United States are "scarce" due to abortion, single parenting, contracep-
tion, decreased fertility, and domestic restrictions on interracial adoption.
Due to a "scarcity" of children, many U.S. adults are childless, and
therefore seek adoptable children elsewhere. As a result, ICA is framed
as a logical or rational solution (supply) to the childless couples (de-
mand). Authors, therefore, observe ICA as a natural "market."
Howard E. Bogard provides the common story of this narrative:
Because of an increase in the number of war-orphaned children,
the system of intercountry adoption has been growing steadily
since the Second World War. The situation can be analyzed in
terms of supply and demand. With an increase in the number of
orphans, certain countries are confronted with a large population
of children without family support. These "sending" [S]tates,
such as South Korea, Peru, Romania, and Colombia, are unable
to place their orphan children internally because of a depleted
adult population that can qualify as adoptive parents. The send-
ing [S]tates represent the supply side of the equation.
Conversely, more industrialized nations, such as the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom, have large adult popu-
lations that wish to adopt children in proportion to the number of
120. Intercountry Adoption Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901 et seq. (West 2008).
121. Wittner, supra note 70, at 620 (observing that the IAA modifies the restrictive defi-
nition of children eligible for adoption and immigration to the United States by permitting the
adoption of children who would not normally qualify as "orphans" if they come from a Hague
Convention country, requiring only that the adopted child's parent or parents be unable to
provide proper care for the child and freely give their irrevocable consent to terminate their
relationship).
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orphans internally available. These "receiving" states fulfill the
demand side of the equation.
22
Counternarratives:
An Overabundance of Western Adults Seeking "Orphans"
Scholars rarely question whether the definition of "orphan" has been
broadened to create a supply of children to meet the demands of Western
adults. 23 To the contrary, authors deliberately call for an expanded defi-
nition of "orphan," arguing that a flexible definition "saves" more
children. 24 In all fairness, a reverse market analogy reveals a large sup-
ply of Western adults seeking infant adoptees, but a questionable demand
for those adults by children in developing countries. Applied honestly,
market theory would question the current narratives. Lynn D. Wardle-a
decided proponent of ICA to "save" children-reveals a staggering num-
ber of Americans, in the millions each year, seeking to adopt:
[I]t has long been estimated that every year, between one million
and two million Americans are able, willing, and want to adopt
an unrelated child or children .... However, less than one-third
of those who... [make] an effort to adopt.., ever... [succeed]
in adopting one or more children. Since only fifty to sixty thou-
sand adoptions of unrelated children (including orphans from
other countries) occur in America in any given year, that means
that only about one percent of the ever-married women who say
122. Bogard, supra note 6, at 581; see also D'Amato, supra note 6, at 1242; Kennard,
supra note 8, at 625-26 (noting that increased demand in the West has led "childless couples
[to turn] to intercountry adoptions, and impoverished, war-torn countries anxious for hard
currency have produced a ripe market"); Marx, supra note 8, at 411; Ryan, supra note 8, at
357. I am no fan of the notion of a market in children, but it is noteworthy that the market
theory is used in order to justify a transaction in which one side gets something that we claim
to be of inestimable value, while the other side is not compensated at all. See generally VIvI-
ANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF
CHILDREN 169-207 (1985).
123. Sara Dillon presents a rare counter-example by querying whether the ICA "market"
is not of our own making:
It is troubling that a good deal of writing on the subject of international adoption
implies that children are available for adoption precisely because someone is will-
ing to "pay for" them. This implies that large numbers of children would not be
institutionalized, and would be with their families of origin, were it not for unscru-
pulous parties preying on birth families in order to feed a "market." In this regard,
the market discourse often used to describe adoption is both misleading and de-
structive.
Dillon, supra note 8, at 234.
124. See, e.g., Bogard, supra note 6, at 612-16 (providing an expanded and uniform
definition of orphan that avoids the constraints of consent or abandonment).
winter 2009]
Michigan Journal of International Law
that they want to adopt are able to adopt in any given year.
Moreover, "the annual total of intercountry adoptions in the
United States saves less than 0.004% (four-thousandths of one
percent) of the number of children that die [worldwide each
year] ... ,,125
While one may question the soundness of Wardle's analysis,1 26 even
when statistics are applied more carefully, the reverse market analogy
does not prove that children in developing counties demand or need
Western parents.27 Since Western discourse establishes that "the best
interest of the child" means a Western "family environment," ICA is of-
ten seen as being in the "the best interest of the child," no matter the
costs to sending countries, children, communities, or birth parents.128
A "blind" justification for ICA that fails to appreciate the humanity
of these children fuels the creation of larger legal, gray, and black mar-
kets for children. Furthermore, law review authors universally condemn
child trafficking, but discuss ICA as a logical market solution without
acknowledging that they may be helping to legitimize ICA as a market.
By framing ICA in market lexicon, the domestic and intercountry
adoption bureaucracies cease to be primarily a means of protecting chil-
dren, and instead become the means by which to "launder" a child from
one country to the next, irrespective of whether the child was paid for or
bought on a gray or black market. 129 After all, once defined as a market,
human considerations are necessarily replaced by the laws of supply and
demand. One scholar recognizes that ICA is such a blatant market that
the best that can be done is to regulate it through price caps and tax in-
centives.,30
125. Wardle, supra note 8, at 345-46 (citations omitted).
126. Wardle's imprecise analysis suggests a statistical correlation between ICA and child
mortality rates. A more careful analysis would undoubtedly reveal that there are indeed many
causes of child death each year and that the number of women who adopt internationally has
little or nothing to do with the number of children who die worldwide each year.
127. Interview with Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, David H. Levin Chair in Family Law,
University of Florida Law School (July 7, 2000) ("My objection to the market analogy (aside
from its devaluation of human worth) has always been that it is backwards. We should be
considering the children as the demand and the would be adoptive parents as the supply.").
128. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Protecting Children's Rights of Identity Across Fron-
tiers of Culture, Political Community, and Time, in FAMILIES ACRoss FRONTIERS 259, 272
(Nigel Lowe & Gillian Douglas eds., 1996) [hereinafter Woodhouse, Protecting Children's
Rights] (suggesting that taking a child-centered perspective that considers a child's best inter-
est necessarily involves considering children in the context of their families and communities
of origin).
129. See generally Smolin, Child Laundering, supra note 9; Smolin, Child Exploitation,
supra note 9.
130. See Goodwin, supra note 8, 76-77.
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The market narrative in law review articles depicts American adop-
tive parents as being "pushed" into ICA due to the scarcity of adoptable
children in the same way that the United States is "pushed" to rely on oil
in lieu of alternative fuel technologies. This narrative shifts responsibil-
ity from adoptive parents and places it squarely on the shoulders of the
inanimate market. The market rhetoric is not without its own negative
externalities since it lifts the veil of humanitarian concern to reveal
Western adults who, it could be argued, are "pushing" for "orphans" be-
cause they feel entitled to a child, as opposed to there being a true
demand for parents for these children.' Nevertheless, the ICA infra-
structure that "launders" these children allows Westerners to believe that
the "legalization" and "naturalization" of a baby proves that no wrong
has been done, and that the child comes with no strings attached.
While the framing of ICA in the language of supply and demand
may come naturally to U.S. legal scholars writing about ICA, legal
scholars must not forget that valid legal instruments such as the CRC
favor placement options in which children grow up in their own culture
and overcome the circumstances that have left them orphaned, aban-
doned, institutionalized, or impoverished.' Questioning Western
discourses in the framing of ICA opens the discussion to alternatives that
may better meet the "best interest of children" from the vantage point of
the child, as well as ease conditions of poverty in their communities.' 33
Not to be dismissed, the counter-narratives also reveal an underlying
yearning by U.S. citizens for family and community. Perhaps U.S. legal
scholars should turn a critical gaze back on U.S. culture and question
whether ICA has become an unstated U.S. population policy to solve
problems endemic to a culture that places the individual above the
131. See, e.g., Padilla, supra note 8, at 839-40. Padilla stated,
What it means to be a good parent in Bangladesh differs from what it means to be a
good parent in the United States. Against this backdrop, it is easy for adoptive par-
ents to rationalize that their adoptive child will "be better off' living with them
because from their cultural viewpoint, their family better fits their definition of "the
best interests of the child." The rationalization is further supported by the adoptive
parents' ability to offer the child better economic conditions than what the child
would have been afforded in the country of origin .... The cultural relativism in-
herent in the "best interests of the child" standard creates the danger of ethnocentric
colonialism.
Id. (citing Lee Aitken, The High Price of a Baby's Love, MONEY, Jan. 1992, at 98, 102).
132. See generally CRC, supra note 1; Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res.
1386, U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Nov. 20, 1959) [hereinafter
1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child].
133. Smolin, The Two Faces, supra note 9, at 485-86 (recognizing the irony of a dis-
course that fails to recognize the full humanity of children and "[tihe arbitrariness of selecting
an individual child for such rescue, while doing little or nothing for those left behind, does not
seem to bother most").
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family. In the end, what may be missing in the law review treatment of
ICA is a healthy dose of self-estrangement.
3 4
III. U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
Although a very complex legal framework governs intercountry
adoption, including the domestic laws of sending and receiving countries
and international law,'35 I do not provide a comprehensive survey here.
My intent is to demonstrate the right of children to live in the context of
their families-the strongest statement of which is in the CRC-and to
show that this right should be considered as a pre-condition to any con-
sideration of ICA.1
36
The CRC is the most widely ratified international human rights
treaty.' 37 It is the result of the evolution of a long-existing recognition
that children have rights as individuals, and, importantly, that these
rights include the right to be raised in the context of their families and
their culture. 38 An early recognition of the rights of the child occurred in
134. See generally David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement:
Some Reflections on the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 4 Wisc.
L. REV. 1062 (1974) (attributing the "crisis" of scholars working in the field of law and devel-
opment to a loss of faith in the basic assumptions underlying their work). These scholars-
including the authors-vouched for a "model of liberal legalism," which, in the end, they
recognize as "ethnocentric and nalve, not only failing to represent legal reality in the develop-
ing world, but in the United States as well." Id.
135. See, e.g., Hague Convention, supra note 110; CRC, supra note 1. For literature
providing a more in-depth analysis of the legal framework, see, e.g., Martin, supra note 8, at
190-213, 216 (comparing the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) to the 1993 Hague
Convention); Szejner, supra note 8, at 216-17 (explaining that the Hague Convention is seen
by some authors as not respecting a child's right to live in the context of their family); Marx,
supra note 8, at 396-406 (emphasizing different placement hierarchies of the CRC and the
Hague Convention and explaining that the CRC emphasizes in-country placement and that the
Hague Convention emphasizes ICA).
136. See Bartholet, Propriety, supra note 83 (presenting an overview of the complex
legal framework governing international adoption).
137. THE U.N. CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: AN ANALYSIS OF TREATY
PROVISIONS AND IMPLICATION OF U.S. RATIFICATION 3 (Jonathan Todres, Mark E. Wojcik &
Cris R. Revaz eds., 2006) [hereinafter CRC: AN ANALYSIS].
138. The ICWA provides an example of a statute that recognizes the fight of a child to
grow up in the context of her family and culture. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901 et seq. The ICWA was
passed in 1978 following a long history of Native American children who had been separated
and alienated from their families and culture. The reasons for the ICWA are stated in the stat-
ute itself, which provides that "an alarmingly high number of Indian families are broken up by
the removal, often unwarranted, of their children from them by nontribal public and private
agencies and that an alarmingly high percentage of such children are placed in non-Indian
foster adoptive homes and institutions." 25 U.S.C. § 1901(4); see also HEALTH AND THE
AMERICAN INDIAN 39-40 (Priscilla A. Day & Hilary N. Weaver eds., 1999). The policy of
separating Native American children from their families began around the time of the Civil
War. The ICWA recognizes the paramount importance of cultural and familial continuity in
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1924, "when the Assembly of the League of Nations passed a resolution
endorsing the Declaration of the Rights of the Child promulgated the
previous year by the Council of the non-governmental 'Save the Chil-
dren International Union." ".39 This document, which came to be known
as the Declaration of Geneva, was the primary document reflecting the
importance of the rights of children for more than a quarter of a cen-
tury.140
In 1959, the U.N. General Assembly promulgated the 1959 Decla-
ration of the Rights of the Child, which is still valid today and was the
impetus for the adoption of the CRC.'4 ' The 1959 Declaration
both producing well-adjusted adults and maintaining the integrity of communities. See 25
U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; see also HEALTH AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN, supra, at 39-40.
139. League of Nations O.J. Spec. Supp. No. 2 1, at 43 (1924) [hereinafter Declaration of
Geneva]; THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: A GUIDE TO
THE "TRAVAUX PREPARATOIRES" 19 (Sharon Detrick ed., 1992) [hereinafter CRC: A GUIDE].
140. CRC: A GUIDE, supra note 139, at 19. The 1924 Declaration of Geneva provides in
full:
By the present Declaration of the Rights of the Child, commonly known as the Dec-
laration of Geneva, men and women of all nations, recognising that mankind owes
to the child the best that it has to give, declare and accept it as their duty that, be-
yond and above all considerations of race, nationality or creed:
1. The child must be given the means requisite for its normal development, both ma-
terially and spiritually;
II. The child that is hungry must be fed; the child that is sick must be helped; the
child that is backward must be helped; the delinquent child must be reclaimed; and
the orphan and the waif must be sheltered and succoured;
11. The child must be the first to receive relief in times of distress;
IV. The child must be put in a position to earn a livelihood and must be protected
against every form of exploitation;
V. The child must be brought up in the consciousness that its talents must be de-
voted to the service of its fellow men.
Declaration of Geneva, supra note 139.
141. 1959 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, supra note 132; see also CRC: A
GUIDE, supra note 139, at 19. There was also a movement in 1948 to revise the Declaration
of Geneva and to issue a new Declaration on the Rights of the Child. See YEARBOOK OF THE
UNITED NATIONS 1947-48, at 611, U.N. Sales No. 1949.11.13 (1949); 1 OFFICE OF THE U.N.
HIGH COMM'ER FOR HUM. RTS., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS
OF THE CHILD 180 (2007), available at http://www.ohchr.org/DocumentslPublications/
LegislativeHistorycrc I en.pdf. Language from this 1948 process appears in secondary sources
and has been mistakenly characterized as a 1948 Declaration on the Rights of the Child, which
was never passed by the General Assembly. See, e.g., CRC: A GUIDE, supra note 139, at 19
(reprinting a "1948 Declaration on the Rights of the Child," despite the fact that such a decla-
ration was never passed); United Nations, About the United Nations/History,
http://www.un.org/aboutun/history.htm (last visited Jan. 8, 2009) (reprinting a version of the
Declaration of Geneva that includes language not in the original but that appears in secondary
sources referencing the 1948 process). While these declarations are important in the
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unambiguously recognized the preeminent right of children to be raised
in the context of their families. Principle 6 of the 1959 Declaration pro-
vides that "[t]he child, for the full and harmonious development of his
personality, needs love and understanding. He shall, whenever possi-
ble, grow up in the care and under the responsibility of his parents ....
Payment of State and other assistance towards the maintenance of chil-
dren in large families is desirable."' 2
The evolution of a child's right to be raised in the context of her
family has been codified in the most widely ratified human rights treaty,
the CRC .' All States that are members of the United Nations, with the
exception of two-the United States and Somalia-have ratified it.'
4
The impact of the treaty has been vast, as it has effected "positive
changes in law, policy, and attitudes toward children's welfare in numer-
ous countries.' ' "4' The CRC provides a comprehensive scheme for the
protection of children. The forty-two separate articles of the Convention,
along with the preamble, reflect a widely shared international recogni-
tion that children have rights and that these rights are in need of
protection.
As did its predecessors, the CRC protects a child's right to grow up
in the context of her family and her culture.'46 In part, this right is based
on the fundamental truth that growing up in the context of one's family
and culture can be crucial to the "basic dignity, survival and develop-
ment"'141 of each one of us. For this reason, as Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse suggests, the purpose of recognizing children's human
rights should not be to divide children from their parents, but to unite
them. 148
international recognition of the need to protect the interests of children, neither the 1924 nor
the 1959 declaration was binding. Declarations are nonbinding, and are designed to be non-
controversial instruments whose purpose it is to build international coalitions and foster
international cooperation. See MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS
AND PROSPECTS 265-82 (1991).
142. 1959 Declaration of the Rights of the Child, supra note 132.
143. CRC: AN ANALYSIS, supra note 137, at 3.
144. See CRC, supra note 1; Child Rights Information Network, Convention on the
Rights of the Child, http://www.crin.org/resources/treaties/CRC.asp?catName=Intemational
+Treatie (last visited Jan. 8, 2009). The United States has signed, but not ratified, the treaty,
and the Somali government does not have an internal government in place in order to ratify
the treaty, even though it has also signed it. CRC: AN ANALYSIS, supra note 137, at 9.
145. CRC: AN ANALYSIS, supra note 137, at 3.
146. Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, The Family-Supportive Nature of the U.N. Convention
on the Rights of the Child, in CRC: AN ANALYSIS, supra note 137, at 39 [hereinafter Wood-
house, The Family-Supportive Nature].
147. CRC: A GUIDE, supra note 139, at ix.
148. Woodhouse, The Family-Supportive Nature, supra note 146, at 39. Berta
Hernndez-Truyol concludes that international law clearly and unambiguously recognizes that
the family is a group entitled to protection by society and the State, but that notwithstanding
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The paramount place of the family unit in the context of children's
rights is emphasized throughout the CRC, including prominently in the
preamble, which provides that "the family, as the fundamental group of
society and the natural environment for the growth and well-being of all
its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary
protection and assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities
within the community,"'49 and further that "the child, for the full and
harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow up in a
family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and under-
standing."' 
50
This recognition of a child's right to be raised in the context of her
family and her culture is emphasized throughout the CRC. For exam-
ple, Article 3(2) provides that "States Parties undertake to ensure the
child such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being,
taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents, legal
guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and,
to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative
measures."'5'' Article 5 of the CRC is similarly protective of a child's
home environment:
its "exalted position in the international realm," the family is not sufficiently considered when
the international community develops the norms, policies, and law that govern international
relationships. Berta Esperanza Hernkndez-Truyol, Asking the Family Question, 38 FAM. L.Q.
481, 481 (2004). Thus, Hernndez-Truyol proposes what she characterizes as a "fundamental
shift in the approach to international policy and law making," an approach that would include
the "asking of the family question" which she characterizes as ensuring that a central inquiry
in any process of international norm or policymaking be to ask what effect the norm or policy
will have on children and families. Id. at 482. For additional evidence of international law's
recognition of the exalted place of the family across a wide range of human rights instruments,
including those that protect civil and political rights, and social, economic, and cultural rights,
see Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 17(1), Nov.
22, 1969, O.A.S. T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123; International Covenant on Civil and Politi-
cal Rights art. 23, Dee. 19, 1966, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter
ICCPR]; Universal Declaration, supra note 47, art. 16(3); see also International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 10(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (stating, in
part, that "[t]he widest possible protection and assistance should be accorded to the family,
which is the natural and fundamental group unit of society"). For a summary of the emergence
of the exalted position of the family in international law, see generally Hernndez-Truyol,
supra.
149. CRC, supra note 1, pmbl. During the drafting process of the CRC, and specifically
of the preamble, the words "as the basic unit of society" were replaced with the words "as the
fundamental group of society," emphasizing the paramount importance of the family in the
context of the rights of the child. See ECOSOC, Comm'n on Hum. Rts., Report of the Working
Group on a Draft Convention on the Rights of the Child, 8-15, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/48
(Mar. 2, 1989).
150. CRC, supra note 1, pmbl.
151. Id. art. 3(2) (emphasis added).
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States Parties shall respect the responsibilities, rights and du-
ties of parents or, where applicable, the members of the
extended family or community as provided for by local cus-
tom, legal guardians or other persons legally responsible for
the child, to provide, in a manner consistent with the evolving
capacities of the child, appropriate direction and guidance in
the exercise by the child of the rights recognized in the present
Convention.'52
Similarly, Article 7 protects a child's "right to know and be cared for by
his or her parents,' 53 Article 9 "ensure[s] that a child shall not be sepa-
rated from his or her parents against their will' 5 4 except when such
separation is in the best interests of the child and is consistent with due
process,' and Article 10 provides that "a child whose parents reside in
different States shall have the right to maintain on a regular basis, save in
exceptional circumstances, personal relations and direct contacts with
both parents.' 56 Additionally, Article 16 of the CRC protects a child's
right to privacy, and provides that "[n]o child shall be subjected to arbi-
trary or unlawful interference with his or her privacy, family, home or
152. Id. art. 5.
153. Id. art. 3(2) (emphasis added). While some rights, such as those expressed in Article
5, are textually expressed in terms of the rights of parents, this right is clearly expressed in
terms of the child's right.
154. Id. art. 9(1). The Committee on the Rights of the Child, the authoritative interpre-
tive body for the CRC, analyzes reports submitted by States Parties regarding their compliance
with the terms of the Convention. In a 1995 response to the Committee's concerns with Bel-
gium's compliance with this article, the Committee noted that
children belonging to the disadvantaged groups of the population appear more
likely to be placed in care. In this regard, the Committee recalls the importance of
the family in the upbringing of a child and emphasizes its view that the separation
of the child from his or her family must take the child's best interests as a primary
consideration.
Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, Consideration of the Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Rights
of the Child: Belgium, 10, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.38 (June 20, 1995). This principle is
also reflected in Article 23(1) of the ICCPR, which provides that "[t]he family is the natural
and fundamental group of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State," and in
Articles 17(1) and 17(2) of the same instrument, which provide that "[n]o one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
not to unlawful attacks on his honor and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of
the law against such interference or attacks." ICCPR, supra note 148, arts. 17(1), 17(2), 23(1).
155. CRC, supra note 1, art. 9; see also Woodhouse, The Family-Supportive Nature,
supra note 146, at 42.
156. CRC, supra note 1, art. 10(2).
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correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his or her honor and reputa-
tion."'57
In order to protect a child's right to be raised in the context of her
family, State Parties to the CRC must "render appropriate assistance to
parents and legal guardians in the performance of their child rearing re-
sponsibilities,"'58 and must "take appropriate measures to assist parents
and others responsible for the child to implement this right and shall in
case of need provide material assistance and support programmes, par-
ticularly with regard to nutrition, clothing and housing.' ' 9 In fact, the
Committee on the Rights of the Child, the authoritative interpretive body
for the CRC, has recognized the importance of the synergy of these two
articles in the context of assisting parents who may be unable to under-
take their child-rearing responsibilities, even if they are not at fault:
Comprehensive measures should be provided for responsible
parenthood and for support to needy families, in order to assist
them in their child-rearing responsibilities, in the light of articles
18 and 27, thus limiting family disruption, reducing the numbers
of institutionalized children and limiting institutionalization to a
measure of last resort.1r°
The import of a child being raised in the context of her family is also
recognized in Article 8, which protects "the right of the child to preserve
his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations.''
157. Id. art. 16. Article 10 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child
similarly provides:
No child shall be subject to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, fam-
ily home or Correspondence, or to the attacks upon his honour or reputation,
provided that parents or legal Guardians shall have the fight to exercise reasonable
supervision over the conduct of their Children. The child has the right to the protec-
tion of the law against such interference or Attacks.
Org. of Afr. Unity [OAU], African Charter on the Rights of the Child art. 10, O.A.U. Doc.
CAB/LEG/24.9/49 (1990) (entered into force Nov. 29, 1999).
158. CRC, supra note 1, art. 18(2); see also Woodhouse, The Family-Supportive Nature,
supra note 146, at 45.
159. CRC, supra note 1, art. 27(3); see also Woodhouse, The Family-Supportive Nature,
supra note 146, at 47.
160. Comm. on the Rts. of the Child, Consideration of Reports of the States Parties
Under Article 44 of the Convention: Concluding Remarks of the Committee on the Rights of
the Child: Italy, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/15/Add.41 (Nov. 27, 1995).
161. CRC, supra note 1, art. 8(1); see also Woodhouse, The Family-Supportive Nature,
supra note 146, at 43. While the CRC is the "holy grail" of children's rights, the notion that
the most natural and healthy place for children to be is with their parents is a principle that is
"firmly entrenched in U.S. constitutional law." Woodhouse, The Family-Supportive Nature,
supra note 146, at 37; see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645 (1972); Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
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While it is true that the right to be raised in the context of one's fam-
ily exists at any age, the issue of culture arises differently for children
who already have language 61 or memories, 63 than it does for infants who
are too young to have acquired such an identity. But this does not mean
that the right to be raised in one's culture does not exist for the latter.
Furthermore, recognizing that no essential cultural identity is attributable
to each race, nationality, or ethnicity, does not deny the existence or the
significance of a multiplicity of cultural identities.' In short, it is clear
that a child's identity involves more than knowing his parents. 65 Sib-
lings, grandparents, other relatives, and other caregivers can be as or
more important to a child's development-specifically to the transmis-
sion of their cultural identity-as are her parents. Children have a
162. Juan Perea illustrates the nexus between language and culture, stating:
It is a gross oversimplification to consider language as merely a utilitarian means of
communication. Language is the carrier and vessel of culture, which in turn shapes
language and perception. Language constitutes a primary symbol of cultural identi-
fication. For Mexican Americans and other Latinos, the Spanish language is a
primary symbol of their culture. The same is true, of course, for English speakers.
Otherwise, European Americans would not be so tied to English as the exclusive
language of proper American identity.
Juan Perea, Buscando America: Why Integration and Equal Protection Fail to Protect Latinos,
117 HARv. L. REV. 1420, 1427 (2004).
163. There are a few scholars who have recognized the loss of culture that may come
with ICA for older children. For example, Stark observes that the consequences of ICA for the
"lost girls of Sudan," would be that, if adopted, these girls "would lose their foster families,
their culture, language, religion, traditions and friends,' and thus it can be argued that the most
effective way to help these girls is to improve life for them without taking them out of their
country and their culture. Stark, Lost Boys, supra note 8, at 292; see also Root, supra note 8,
at 353 ("The international community has a duty to honor the principles outlined in the CRC,
[the Hague Convention], and the African Charter. These principles include the right of African
children to maintain their cultural identity and heritage."). Similarly, while Woodhouse has
argued that race and culture should be part of domestic adoption law, her conclusions are just
as applicable to the context of ICA. She states that
[her] premise is that race and culture of origin, no matter how hard to define with
satisfying logic, do matter to children and therefore should matter in adoption law.
They may well be contingent and socially constructed, but children's awareness of
race and group identity indicate that they are "real" for the purposes that matter
here-the fostering and protection of children's identity.
Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Are You My Mother?": Conceptualizing Children's Identity
Rights in TransracialAdoptions, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 107, 114 (1995).
164. Interestingly, the title of the CRC refers to the "child" rather than "children." See
CRC, supra note 1. This might be interpreted to imply a universal commonality of identity for
children, and it does, but in a way that is not in conflict with the recognition of a child's indi-
vidualism and humanity. The CRC recognizes that all children are in need of protection
because they are children, while, at the same time, recognizing that this protection necessarily
involves the respect for, and the protection of, the differences between children-i.e., a recog-
nition of their full humanity.
165. See, e.g., id. art. 7.
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remarkable capacity to embrace relationships with many people, speak
multiple languages, and enjoy a complex world at a very young age. It is
the complex interaction between a child's birth country, place, region,
town, race, ethnicity, nationality, and language that she has the right to
experience, if possible, regardless of the extent to which she has already
"acquired" such an identity in a way that removal from her environment
would be objectively harmful to her.
The movement in the United States to keep adoptions open '66 sug-
gests that even if children are not old enough to have memories of the
places from where they came, origin is still part of their identity.167 This
identity has been described as "a root or ground of belonging that is in-
side the child,,6 6 but also as part of a child's identity that connects her to
others with similar "skin color, hair texture, [and] facial features.' 69
Scholars have suggested that this aspect of a child's culture is such a
166. See E. WAYNE CARP, FAMILY MATTERS: SECRECY AND DISCLOSURE IN THE His-
TORY OF ADOPTION 196-222 (1998); Barbara Yngvesson, Negotiating Motherhood: Identity
and Difference in "Open" Adoptions, 31 LAW & Soc'Y REv. 31 (1997); Sam Howe Verhovek,
Debate on Adoptees'Rights Stirs Oregon, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at Al.
167. PETER L. BENSON ET AL., GROWING Up ADOPTED: A PORTRAIT OF ADOLESCENTS
AND THEIR FAMILIES 26 (1994) (finding that sixty-five percent of adopted adolescents would
like to meet their birth parents); DAVID M. BRODZINSKY ET AL., BEING ADOPTED: THE LIFE-
LONG SEARCH FOR SELF (1992) (exploring the importance of birth relations to identity
formation of adoptees); Woodhouse, Protecting Children's Rights, supra note 128, at 274
(acknowledging the importance of recognizing and protecting a child's access to their identity
of origin, which Woodhouse describes as her family and the groups into which she was born);
Barbara Yngvesson, Going "Home": Adoption, Loss of Bearings, and the Mythology of Roots,
in CULTURES OF TRANSNATIONAL ADOPTION, supra note 93, at 25, 26-28 [hereinafter Yngves-
son, Going "Home"].
168. BETTY JEAN LIFTON, JOURNEY OF THE ADOPTED SELF: A QUEST FOR WHOLENESS
(1994); Fernando Col6n, Family Ties and Child Placement, 17 FAM. PROCESS 289, 302 (1978)
(describing the importance of birth connections as "a deeply felt psychological and emotional
need, a need for roots, for existential continuity, and for a sense of completeness"); Wood-
house, Protecting Children's Rights, supra note 128, at 274; Yngvesson, Going "Home",
supra note 167, at 26; see also SANDRA PATTON, BIRTHMARKS: TRANSRACIAL ADOPTION IN
CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 1 (2000) (quoting a transracial adoptee as saying that "to have a
family tree ... I had an idea of roots, that you had to be able to trace it biologically .... ").
Although not all adoptees may feel a need to connect with their birth history-their family,
cultural, racial, or geographic origins-the vast majority of adoptees have such an interest.
BENSON ET AL., supra note 167, at 26; see also Yngvesson, Placing the "Gift Child", supra
note 8, at 239 (arguing that it is the adoptive child's preexisting ties to a family, a history, and
a culture, not just their potential for the future, that distinguishes prospective adoptees from
mere commodities).
169. Yngvesson, Going "Home", supra note 167, at 26; see also LIPTON, supra note
168; Woodhouse, Protecting Children's Rights, supra note 128, at 274; Yngvesson, Placing
the "Gift Child", supra note 8, at 237 (arguing that, in adoption, "the child moves, but 'Chine-
seness,' 'American Indianness,' 'Koreanness,' or 'Colombianness' remains the same (or rather,
these qualities are enhanced and constituted anew as immutable in this movement)").
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significant part of her identity that alienation from it can be psychologi-
cally harmful.'70
In sum, it is the rights of a child to be raised in the context of her
family and culture, and which are compromised due to our too narrow
conception of the rights and interests of children, which reflect an artifi-
cially narrow conception of intercountry adoption. This conception fails
to appreciate the full humanity of these children due to a failure to listen
to their stories; a conception that I have defined as MonoHumanism. In-
stead, a child's right to live in the context of her family and her culture
should be considered as a pre-condition to any consideration of ICA.
IV. A WORLD WITHOUT MONOHUMANISM
A. The Current Adoption Debate
The intention of this Article is to broaden a debate and discussion
that is often binary and under-inclusive in that it fails to include all of the
voices that should be heard on the interests of children. Bartholet sum-
marizes the binary nature of the current debate in the following way:
Human rights issues are at the core of the current debate over in-
ternational adoption. Many of us who support international
adoption see it as serving the most fundamental human rights of
the most helpless of humans-the rights of children to the kind
of family love and care that will enable them to grow up with a
decent chance of living a healthy and fulfilling life. Many who
oppose international adoption, however, argue that it violates the
human rights of children placed and of any birth parents that
may exist, and serves only the interests of those who should be
seen as having no rights-the adults who want to become par-
ents.7 '
The two sides of this debate are often in direct conflict: the advocates of
intercountry adoption in strong support, and the human rights activists in
170. Woodhouse, Protecting Children's Rights, supra note 128, at 274; H.J. Sants, Ge-
nealogical Bewilderment in Children with Substitute Parents, 37 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 133,
140 (1964); see David M. Brodzinsky, A Stress and Coping Model of Adoption Adjustment, in
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ADOPTION 3, 7 (David M. Brodzinsky & Marshall D. Schechter eds.,
1990); BRODZINSKY ET AL., supra note 167, at 58-59, 63-64, 99-101; ALFRED KADUSHIN,
CHILD WELFARE SERVICES 494 (3d ed. 1980); JOHN TRISELIOTIS ET AL., ADOPTION: THEORY,
POLICY AND PRACTICE 14 (1997) (arguing that an adoptee is more likely to be psychologically
healthy if he/she acknowledges "his/her biological roots and heritage, including [his/her] race
and ethnicity"); Marianne Berry, Stress and Coping Among Older Child Adoptive Families, I
SOC. WORK & SOC. Sci. REV. 71, 74 (1989).
171. Bartholet, Thoughts, supra note 12, at 151-52.
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a posture that "is generally critical of international adoption, calling ei-
ther for its abolition, or for restrictions that curtail its incidence... *,172
The critics of intercountry adoption argue that children adopted in-
ternationally will have difficulties adjusting to their new languages and
cultures,' or that the child will develop identity problems due to being
raised by parents of a different race, ethnicity, or nationality.74 Critics
have also argued that intercountry adoption "retards the growth" "' of
infrastructure, such as child welfare systems, within countries that could
care for children in-country and have raised ethical and moral objections
to intercountry adoption, based on the notion that it is the healthy chil-
dren who are adopted, while the older and disabled children are left
behind to live the remainder of their lives in institutions."6 These objec-
tions have a post-colonial hue; that industrialized countries exploit
developing countries and steal their national resources, i.e., their healthy
children.'
7
There are also those who raise objections to such adoption when
adoptive parents engage in the process of "othering," which, the argu-
ment goes, results in stigmatizing a child's "former" culture and the
"implie[d] abandonment of her biological family and the death of her old
self' ' due to a "legal rebirth--complete with a new name and iden-
tity-into a new family ... [that] symbolically grants the child the good
parents and good life she previously lacked .... 79 These objections are
based on fundamental principles of child development and attachment
theory that were pioneered by the British psychiatrist and psychoanalyst
John Bowlby. Bowlby recognized that a child is not always a clean slate
172. Id. at 152.
173. Perry, Mothers, supra note 9, at 131.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 132. Rita J. Simon and Howard Alstein, who have written extensively on
international adoption, have observed that "what the West has generally viewed as charitable,
humane--even noble-behavior, developing countries have come to define as imperialistic,
self-serving, and a return to a form of colonialism, in which whites exploit and steal natural
resources. In the 1970s and 1980s, children were the natural resource being exploited ... "
Howard Alstein & Rita J. Simon, Introduction to INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: A MULTINA-
TIONAL PERSPECTIVE 2 (HOWARD ALSTEIN & RITA J. SIMON ed., 1991); see also Jane Rowe,
Perspectives on Adoption, in ADOPTION: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 6 (Euthymia D.
Hibbs ed., 1991) (illustrating the sentiment of some developing countries regarding interna-
tional adoption in stating that "[f]irst you want our labor and raw materials; now you want our
children").
178. Marsha Garrison, Parents' Rights vs. Children's Interests: The Case of the Foster
Child, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 371, 394 (1996-97). While Garrison's arguments
are used in the context of domestic adoption, they are based on fundamental principles of
child development and attachment theory that are as applicable in the international context as
in the domestic context.
179. Id. at 387.
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"from which the past can be rubbed by a duster or sponge,"' 80 and by that
extension a fundamental part of a child's identity is part of where that
child is from, and the connection that a child feels to people with whom
she shares common "skin color, hair texture, [and] facial features."'8 '
These objections are essentially based on the idea that an "othering"
process, while well intentioned, is nonetheless a rejection of a funda-
mental part of that child that suggests to the child that she is not fully
part of a family, a community, or a nation.
On the other hand, the position that many advocates of intercountry
adoption take is simple. While they freely acknowledge that intercountry
adoption is not a panacea, they also argue that, given the large number of
children who need someone to take care of them, intercountry adoption
not only provides a good solution for children whose parents are not in a
position to take care of them, but by taking care of children who would
otherwise have no options, "it pushes us on a path to creating a more just
world.', 82 These are, the argument goes, children who otherwise would
be homeless and living on the streets or "doomed to grow up in orphan-
,,183ages ....
The debate has become one that is particularly polarized, and major
children's and human rights groups have weighed in on the issues. Both
the U.N. Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the U.N. Committee on the
Rights of the Child have taken positions that have been characterized by
some as opposing intercountry adoption.' UNICEF's official policy on
intercountry adoption, according to some proponents of intercountry
adoption, "makes clear its generally negative attitude to international
adoption ... [and] only grudgingly approves of such adoption, and
places it low on the hierarchy of alternatives for children in need of care
.... ""' In fact, UNICEF does not condemn ICA but does clearly place it
lower on the hierarchy than the right to be raised by one's own family. In
part, UNICEF's policy provides:
For children who cannot be raised by their own families, an ap-
propriate alternative family environment should be sought in
preference to institutional care which should be used only as a
last resort and as a temporary measure. Inter-country adoption is
one of a range of care options which may be open to children,
and for individual children who cannot be placed in a permanent
180. JOHN BOWLBY, MATERNAL CARE AND MENTAL HEALTH 113 (1952); see also JOHN
BOWLBY, A SECURE BASE: CLINICAL APPLICATIONS OF ATTACHMENT THEORY (1988).
181. Yngvesson, Going "Home ", supra note 167, at 26.
182. Bartholet, Thoughts, supra note 12, at 158.
183. Id. at 180.
184. Id. at 154.
185. Id. at 154-56.
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family setting in their countries of origin, it may indeed be the
best solution.
186
Similarly, the European Parliament has taken the position that inter-
country adoption violates the human rights of children and has sought to
make outlawing intercountry adoption a condition of joining the Euro-
pean Union. 1 7 Many nations that had been "sending nations," or
countries that supplied children, drastically cut back or even stopped the
practice of intercountry adoption.'88 At the same time, advocates of inter-
country adoption have suggested that, "given the realities of today's
world, and the existence of so many children who will not be raised by
their birth parents, international adoption does provide a very good solu-
tion for virtually all of those homeless children lucky enough to get
placed."'8
My intention is not to land on either side of this binary, contentious
debate. Instead, my goal is to remind all of those interested in the wel-
fare of children that binary debates are under-inclusive of all of the
interests that should come to bear on any given situation. My goal is to
remind those interested in protecting the rights of both birth and adoptive
families that the most difficult problems that we face can never be solved
with simple solutions, but rather merit solutions as nuanced as the prob-
lems themselves. This reality is why Alessandro Conticini, the head of
child protection at UNICEF Ethiopia, is one of a number of people who
work in the field of intercountry adoption who are advocates of inter-
country adoption, but believe that it must be "part of a larger strategy"
that focuses on keeping children within their countries of origin and
within the context of their families and communities.' 90 The fact that
there are no easy solutions is underscored by the anguish of a potential
adoptive couple adopting from Ethiopia:
186. UNICEF, Inter-country Adoption, http://www.unicef.org/media/media_41918.html
(last visited Jan. 26, 2009).
187. See European Parliamentarians Break the Nicholson Monopoly of International
Adoptions, BUCHAREST DAILY NEWS, Mar. 8, 2006, available at http://www.charlestannock.com/
pressarticle.asp?ID=l 190 (noting that the European Parliament's prior rapporteur on Romania
had taken the position that Romania should ban international adoption and that the European
Commission had subsequently pressured Romania into passing a law banning international
adoption).
188. Bartholet, Thoughts, supra note 12, at 158; see also Ethica, The Statistics Tell the
Story, http://www.ethicanet.org/item.phprecordid=statistics (last visited Jan. 8, 2009). Ethica
is an organization that advocates for more effective regulations governing international adop-
tion. Ethica's website notes that over the last fifteen years, forty different countries were
among the top twenty countries of origin for U.S. families that have adopted from abroad, and,
of these, thirteen are closed or effectively closed, the latter meaning that the adoption of chil-
dren has fallen to twenty-six or fewer annually. Id.
189. Bartholet, Thoughts, supra note 12, at 158.
190. See Gross & Connors, Surge in Adoptions, supra note 22.
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Some parents anguished, as did Karla Suomala of Decorah,
Iowa, when she arrived in Addis Abada to adopt 5-year-old
Dawit and his 21-month-old-sister Meheret.
"It's hard to know what the right thing is to do," Ms. Suomala
said. "Should we just give all the money we're spending on this
to the children's mother?" Ms. Suomala and her husband, David
Vasquez, had already spent time with her.
"It was obvious the birth mother loved her children," Mr.
Vasquez said. "She said to us, 'Thank you for sharing my bur-
den.'"' 9
A more nuanced conversation about adoption should include strate-
gies such as requiring foreign agencies to provide social services in-
country if they want to facilitate international adoptions, as is the case in
Ethiopia. Another strategy would be a large-scale effort by Western gov-
ernments to right the "social and economic injustice"'' 92 that creates
situations in which birth parents are forced to consider adoption as an
alternative for their children. The consequence of such reforms likely
would not be the end of ICA, but an increase in the numbers of children
provided with opportunities to grow up in the context of their families
and their culture. While an exhaustive discussion of potential reforms is
beyond the scope of this Article, what is clear is that we need to have a
more nuanced discussion than we are currently having regarding the in-
terests of children; a discussion that reflects the humanity of the children
and the families in developing countries in addition to our own human-
ity. This discussion must identify and dismantle the concept of
MonoHumanism.
B. Potential Reforms
1. Mandatory Contributions to Sending Countries
Currently, some States require that the adoptive parents donate
money to the orphanage from which they adopt.' 93 Instead of, or in addi-
tion to, donations to orphanages, individuals could be required to
contribute to programs designed to facilitate family preservation and in-
country placement of children. In this way, adoptive parents would not
only contribute to the movement of children out of their birth country,
but would help strengthen the environment in which children are living
191. Id.
192. Bartholet, Thoughts, supra note 12, at 158.
193. See Bureau of Consular Aff., U.S. Dep't of State, Country Specific Information
About Adoption, http://adoption.state.gov/countryinformafion.html# (last visited Jan. 26,
2009).
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inside of that country. These programs could take many forms, and could
be modeled on family preservation programs currently in place within
any given country, or could be modeled on family preservation programs
currently in place in the United States, 94 with the goal of helping a fam-
ily temporarily unable to care for their children. For example, in San
Francisco, parents are provided assistance in meeting their basic needs
(food, clothing, etc.), taught parenting skills, taught how to manage their
money, provided crisis counseling when necessary, assisted in locating
safe, affordable housing, provided affordable transportation or taught
how to use public transportation, and linked up with relevant community
resources.'95 Similarly, in one of the most extensive family preservation
programs in the United States, families in the Michigan child welfare
system are provided with home management skills, parenting classes,
relocation assistance, domestic violence education, and financial assis-
tance aimed at making families independent. 196 These are examples of
programs that could facilitate family preservation and in-country place-
ment of children.
In addition to individual donations, the U.S. government could be
required to pay a fee for the right to adopt children from a country, with
the proceeds from the fee to be used to support family preservation and
in-country adoption. 197
Requiring mandatory donations to countries would be one way to
begin to address the concern of some of the critics of intercountry adop-
tion who have argued that intercountry adoption retards the growth of
infrastructure within countries that could care for children in-country,
such as child welfare systems, and to those critics who have raised
ethical and moral objections to intercountry adoption, based on the no-
tion that poverty should not be a basis on which the right to rear children
is determined.
194. By family preservations systems, I mean systems that are designed to increase the
capacity of families to care for their children and therefore minimize the family's involvement
with formal child welfare services.
195. Family Support Services of the Bay Area, Family Preservation Program,
http://www.fssba-oak.org/programs/familypres.htm#servicesoffered (last visited Jan. 8, 2009).
196. Lutheran Child & Fain. Serv. of Mich., Families First, http://www.lcfsmi.org/
services/familypreservation/families-first.asp (last visited Jan. 8, 2009).
197. There has been a long-standing debate in the United States in which some have
argued that the child protective system should focus on family preservation policies, while
others have argued that the goal of the preserving families inherently conflicts with the goal of
protecting children. See, e.g., RENNY GOLDEN, DISPOSABLE CHILDREN: AMERICA'S CHILD
WELFARE SYSTEM 149 (1997) (characterizing this debate as family preservation versus chil-
dren's rights).
198. Id.
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2. Make the Child's Right to Be Raised in the Context of Her Family
and Her Culture Under the CRC a Threshold Determination to
Intercountry Adoption
There are many countries in which children are cared for in "non-
traditional" or "informal" caregiving relationships as measured by West-
ern norms. These caregiving relationships include various relatives,
godparents, employers and neighbors, state-run boarding schools, or
some combination thereof. 99 In some of these countries, intercountry
adoptions are not permitted.2°° Based on ethnographic fieldwork with the
urban poor of Porto Alegre, Brazil, Claudia Fonseca illustrates "how ex-
tremely poor women resort to a wide range of strategies-from
charitable patrons and state-run boarding schools to mutual help net-
works involving a form of shared parenthood,, 20 1 in an effort to
"contribute to the rethinking of national as well as intercountry adoption
from the bottom up. '202 Some of these caregiving relationships include
individuals who we, in the West, would generally not consider family.
Our adoption norms, therefore, could be changed to reflect these care-
giving relationships, so that children would (typically) not be adopted if
care in one of these relationships was possible, even if the child would
be considered an "orphan" by Western standards. What this would mean,
in concrete terms, would be that a child's right to be raised in the context
of her family and her culture under the CRC would be considered as a
pre-condition to any consideration of ICA. Currently, adoption law does
not take this approach. With the adoption of the Hague Convention, in-
ternational law has moved away from the approach of the CRC. The
preamble to the 1993 Hague Convention reads, in part:
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious devel-
opment of his or her personality, should grow up in a family
environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and under-
standing,
Recalling that each State should take, as a matter of priority, ap-
propriate measures to enable the child to remain in the care of
his or her family of origin,
199. Perry, supra note 9, at 131.
200. For a list of countries in which ICA is not permitted, see Bureau of Consular Aff.,
supra note 193.
201. Fonseca, Patterns, supra note 93, at 143.
202. Id.
[Vol. 30:413
Challenging MonoHumanism
Recognizing that intercountry adoption may offer the advantage
of a permanent family to a child for whom a suitable family
cannot be found in his or her State of origin...203
This language is a significant change from previous international
documents that discussed intercountry adoption. For example, Article 17
of the 1986 U.N. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to
the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster
Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally (1986 Declara-
tion), states, "[i]f a child cannot be placed in a foster or an adoptive
family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared for in the country of
origin, intercountry adoption may be considered as an alternative means
of providing the child with a family. 2°4 Note the difference between the
1993 Hague Convention, which speaks of finding "a suitable family,"
and the 1986 Declaration, which speaks of caring for a child "in any
suitable manner."205 The Hague Convention "clearly favors suitable fam-
ily care for children even if it is necessary to allow a child to leave its
country of origin ', 206 over "non-family" caregiving relationships.
The shift away from non-family member caregiving, or, more accu-
rately, non-Western, family-style caregiving is also evident in the
language of the CRC, which preceded the Hague Convention. Article 20
of the CRC provides:
1. A child temporarily or permanently deprived of his or her
family environment, or in whose own best interests cannot be
allowed to remain in that environment, shall be entitled to spe-
cial protection and assistance provided by the State.
2. States Parties shall in accordance with their national laws
ensure alternative care for such a child.
3. Such care could include, inter alia, foster placement, kafala
of Islamic law, adoption or if necessary placement in suitable in-
stitutions for the care of children. When considering solutions,
due regard shall be paid to the desirability of continuity in a
203. Hague Convention, supra note 110, pmbl. (emphasis added).
204. Declaration on Social and Legal Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare
of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Interna-
tionally, G.A. Res. 41/85, art. 17, U.N. Doc. A/RES/41/85 (Dec. 3, 1986) [hereinafter 1986
Declaration on Social and Legal Principles] (emphasis added).
205. Hague Convention, supra note 110; see also William L. Pierce, Accreditation of
Those Who Arrange Adoptions Under the Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption as a
Means of Protecting, Through Private International Law, the Rights of Children, 12 J. CON-
TEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 535, 538-39 (1996) (discussing the conflict between the 1993
Hague Convention, the 1986 Declaration, and the CRC).
206. Pierce, supra note 205, at 539.
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child's upbringing and to the child's ethnic, religious, cultural
and linguistic background. 07
Because "intercountry adoption" is never mentioned in Article 20, some
have argued that, pursuant to this article, "inter-country adoptions would
be unlikely unless the receiving country was able to assure that the
child's upbringing would reflect the context of the child's country of ori-
gin with its specific 'ethnic, religious, cultural and linguistic
background.' ' 20 1 Similarly, Article 21 of the CRC seems to reflect the
(abandoned) preference in the 1986 Declaration for in-country place-
ment, when it provides that "intercountry adoption may be considered as
an alternative means of child's care, if the child cannot be placed in a
foster or an adoptive family or cannot in any suitable manner be cared
for in the child's country of origin."2'9
Unfortunately, because all adoptees are classified as "orphans" pur-
suant to statistics compiled by the U.S. Department of State, it is
impossible to know how many children who are adopted have one birth
parent, two birth parents, or can otherwise be cared for in their country
of origin. What we do know, however, is that there are many children
being cared for in social networks that do not reflect a modem nuclear
family, including various relatives, godparents, employers and neighbors,
state-run boarding schools, or some combination thereof, and that the
concept of a modern nuclear family may or may not have any relevance
to these children and their families.20
Thus, notwithstanding the Hague Convention's apparent movement
away from in-country care in non-Western family-style situations, we
207. CRC, supra note 1, art. 20.
208. Pierce, supra note 205, at 539.
209. CRC, supra note 1, art. 21(b) (emphasis added).
210. Fonseca, Patterns, supra note 93, at 143, 149. Fonseca explains,
For the outside observer, the nonchalance with which people treat child circulation
is striking. I have seen, for example, two young women in the process of getting to
know each other complete their life of identifying questions ("On which street do
you live?" "Are you not the daughter of so-and-so?" "How many children do you
have?") with the final inquiry of "And are you raising all your children?" A good
number of youngsters claim to have decided, they themselves, where they wanted to
live. Indeed, it is not unusual to hear even a six- or seven-year-old explaining:
"Auntie asked me to visit, I liked it, so I just told my mom I was going to stay on."
People will include in their own life histories a list of various households in which
they lived as a child-with a predictable variety of commentaries. Some foster par-
ents are remembered as wicked slave drivers and some as fairy godmothers, but
most are described in quite matter-of-fact terms .... [M]any, many, people will
speak of two, three, and four "mothers" with no particular embarrassment or confu-
sion. Against such a background, one wonders if it makes sense to single out the
nuclear family as an analytical isolate.
Id. at 149-50.
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should reform and interpret laws governing intercountry adoption, as
Fonseca suggests, "from the bottom up," to make sure that we are not
removing children from what they would describe as family.
3. More Honest Enforcement of Laws
The enforcement of international law can be particularly difficult;
unless a treaty is self-executing, many States must legislate treaty provi-
sions into law and then enforce that law. Thus, it is not uncommon for
States to fail to implement or enforce their treaty obligations. In addi-
tion, some States, including the United States, routinely exempt
themselves from honoring certain treaty provisions. Both of these prac-
tices would (and do) tend to undermine the effective implementation of
international treaties.
It may be worth focusing more resources on the enforcement of laws
that protect the right of a child to live in the context of her family. Many
have argued that current laws are ineffective. For example, with respect
to the Hague Convention, scholars have argued that "[d]espite the con-
vention's good intentions, serious questions must be raised regarding its
effectiveness, ' in part, because of the compromises that needed to be
made that weakened the "integrity of the instrument" 212 and the absence
of an international body to oversee compliance by the signatories to the
Convention. While the Hague Convention provides for central authorities
to be established in each State, because each State has sole authority to
accredit its own Central Authority, one scholar has argued that, "in ef-
fect, each country is still policing its own international adoptions',"
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which is, it could be argued, right back where we started. The solution,
then, may be the "existence of an international cooperative effort which
has enforcement power.
211
Whether the problem is with the Hague Convention itself or with
another part of the very complex legal framework governing intercountry
adoption, stricter enforcement--or the creation of enforcement
211. Chadwick, supra note 74, at 138; see, e.g., Katz, supra note 8, at 306-07 (arguing
that the Convention fails to protect the interests of children because it does not harmonize
domestic laws under uniform principles); Berger, supra note 8, at 45 ("[T]he Convention has
several major weaknesses that make it inadequate as an overall model for reform. One weak-
ness is that implementation is left largely to the participating countries, with only general
guidance on how to structure the program and prevent abuse."); Ryan, supra note 8, at 382-83
(finding that the Hague Convention falls short in that it is least likely to be effectively imple-
mented in countries in which it is most needed, because political and economic strife in said
countries weaken their governments, and because certain key provisions of the Convention are
ambiguous).
212. Chadwick, supra note 74, at 138.
213. Id. (emphasis omitted).
214. Id. at 143.
Winter 20091
Michigan Journal of International Law
provisions--could be a step in the direction of protecting the rights of all
children.
CONCLUSION
Whether you take resources to the child, or bring the child to a place
where there are resources, is an old struggle that continues in the United
States today. There is the example of "orphan trains" on the one hand
and settlement houses on the other. Or, community-based foster care as
opposed to expedited adoption. We are undoubtedly still wrestling with
this question as a society. A related question is whether it is ever accept-
able to take a child out of her home because of poverty. This Article does
not dispute that these are challenging questions, but instead tries to re-
frame the discussion by arguing that the right of a child to be raised in
the context of her family and her culture is essential to pulling us back
from the simplistic and ethnocentric notion that it is always in the best
interest of a child to be raised in a more affluent and formally educated
family in a country (or town) with "better" schools, hospitals, and other
so-called Western conveniences.
As I have discussed throughout this paper, the CRC provides a legal
framework that should protect a child's right to be raised in the context
of her family and her culture. Unfortunately, our failure to come to terms
with our imperialist orientation toward the world has resulted in our vio-
lating these most fundamental of rights of children. This failure has been
caused, in part, by how we have constructed the ways of thinking about
intercountry adoption that we have adopted as truth. We currently have a
distorted and artificially narrow conception of intercountry adoption, a
conception that I have referred to in this Article as MonoHumanism.
My goal in writing this Article is to begin a discussion that will en-
sure that we protect children who might have an option of being raised
by their birth parents or other caregivers in the context of their culture.
My suggestion here is that by acknowledging the power of discourse, or,
more specifically, the discursive formations in society that make all
knowledge possible, we can begin to develop coherence between our
laws and our actions. My suggestion here is that this will take us one
step closer to dismantling the concept of MonoHumanism.
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